



Article

Embracing Clientelism: The Case of the Prosperous Justice Party in Indonesia

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Abstract

This study aims to explain how political parties' electoral strategy portfolios diversify from clientelistic to programmatic strategies. In this regard, key question includes: how socioeconomic differences among the electoral districts affect the organization and electoral portfolios of party branches? Based on field research in Indonesia (Jakarta) concerning party-voter linkage, I argue that parties' access to state resources and voter demands affect party strategies' portfolios. Parties organize themselves and appeal to voters differently based on a district's socioeconomic condition. In rich urban areas, parties try to appeal to voters using policy-oriented strategies, whereas in poor rural and urban areas parties are more likely to pursue a clientelistic strategy. The research is based on a field research in North Jakarta (socioeconomically less-developed) and South Jakarta (socioeconomically more developed) with a particular focus on the Prosperous Justice Party's (PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahterah) electoral strategies in these districts during opposition (1999-2004) and governing (2004-2009 and 2009-2014) periods.

Keywords

Clientelism, Indonesian politics, Prosperous justice party, Political party strategy, Political party organization, Voter demands

Introduction

Political parties in developing democracies are more likely to possess clientelistic features with patronage networks and lack of ideological differences among parties. For instance, in Indonesia, most political parties exhibit clientelistic practices. They are weakly organized and highly personalistic, striving to deliver personal benefits and patronage jobs to voters (Aspinall et al., 2017; Mietzner, 2009; Shin, 2015). An exception is the PKS (Prosperous Justice Party – Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) which can be considered as a programmatic party with a merit-based recruitment system, and strong party organization. Although the party was once programmatic,

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the PKS has recently become more clientelistic; indeed, it is involved in patronage and money politics (Hamayotsu, 2015; Tanuwidjaja, 2010; Tomsa, 2010, 2012), and this has given rise to factionalism within the party, which harms the organizational cohesion. In addition to this, the party now nominates outsider resource wise wealthy candidates rather than candidates with a PKS background (Mietzner, 2009; Park, 2021b; Tomsa, 2012). Then, how do PKS and many other parties in developing democracies get involved in mixed strategies (clientelistic and programmatic practices)? How the party strategies diversify in developing democracy countries? More specifically, how socioeconomic differences among the electoral districts affect the organization and electoral portfolios of party branches? This research aims to answer these questions and argues that parties' access to state resources and voter demands have an influence on changes in party strategy and shapes their clientelistic or programmatic appeals. In order to support the main argument, a field research was conducted in two districts of Jakarta (Indonesia), namely North Jakarta (urban poor) and South Jakarta (urban rich). The data for this research was collected mostly from in-depth interviews with politicians and party activity observations.

Research on Party Strategies

Recent research shows how parties may change organizationally and strategically. More specifically, parties may pursue different strategies simultaneously based on the economic conditions and voter demands. Levitsky (2003; 2007) examines the transformation of the Justicialista Party (PJ, in Argentina), which was once programmatic, but has turned into a clientelistic machine as a result of weakening ties with unions. Although Levitsky's work is primarily on party institutionalization, it is important to see how the loosely organized structure of the party helps it to adapt to its environment and become clientelistic. Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2016) demonstrate a reverse transformation; from a clientelistic regime (with discretionary antipoverty transfers, of benefits to a particular district or electorate) to an entitlement (a nondiscretionary, rules-based, social protection system) regime in Mexico. In Argentina, Weitz-Shapiro (2014) demonstrates that parties may abandon clientelistic practices in districts where electoral competition is high and a significant middle-class population is present. In another research, Magaloni (2006) shows how the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) of Mexico survived and sustained a hegemonic party system by using a complex set of distribution, including clientelistic activities (targeted side payments, cash transfers, food subsidies, etc.) and programmatic strategies (policies on economic growth). Likewise, Calvo and Murillo (2019) argue that parties may use a combined strategy, but, according to them, various preferences of voters is the main reason why the parties provide policy and non-policy benefits (policy diversification). However, both Magaloni (2006), who observes a long period of Mexican PRI strategies, and Calvo and Murillo (2019), who focus on Argentina and Chile, are based on nation-wide strategies. While focusing on electoral campaigns in Peru, Munoz (2019) argues that clientelistic exchanges during the electoral campaigns help politicians to mix electoral strategies. Nichter (2018) focuses on the choices of citizens in sustainability of relational clientelism and argues that citizens "play an instrumental role in the survival of relational clientelism" (p. 6). By receiving direct benefits from politicians, citizens declare support and politicians are able to build trust among the citizens.

Rather than studying the transformation of parties (Levitsky, 2003, 2007) or system level research (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016), this study particularly focuses on party strategies in well-off and urban poor districts. It shows that parties may pursue a mixed strategy (programmatic and clientelistic) in well-off districts not because of electoral competition (Magaloni, 2006) but

because of voter demands in relatively underdeveloped neighbourhoods of the same district. Secondly, these studies generally ignore the fact that parties may not have access to state resources all the time. Parties' position in the government or opposition may affect their electoral strategies (portfolios). Hence, this research aims to demonstrate the effects of parties' access to state resources on parties' electoral strategy, organizational structure and party-voter linkage as well. Lastly, in addition to electoral strategies that are employed by political parties, this study will demonstrate that political parties can also change their strategy from programmatic to clientelistic (or clientelistic to programmatic) based on voter demands and access to resources.

Theory on Electoral Strategy Change

I argue that parties' access to state resources and voter demands affect parties' electoral portfolios. When a party is in the governing position, the party is more likely to pursue a mixed strategy as the party has easier access to state resources. The resource control is crucial for parties because it also provides access to patronage jobs and resource allocation based on party's demands (Wantchekon, 2003). A more clientelistic strategy becomes more likely when the party is in the government although the research provides a mixed picture on clientelistic parties and distributive incentives (Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987; Stokes, 2007). Likewise, based on the interviews in this research, the PKS party branches are more likely to prefer clientelistic strategy towards low-income voters when the party is in the governing position. Although the PKS may still carry out the promoted national policies, abundant resources give an opportunity to expand its vote share. When in the opposition, parties are less likely to pursue a clientelistic strategy because of lacking financial resources.

When voter demands are considered, the research shows that there is a difference based on socioeconomic conditions of voters. On the one hand, well-off voters (more educated with better income levels) are likely to demand programmatic policies and low income voters are likely to accept direct, tangible benefits (Arslantaş & Arslantaş, 2023; Desposato, 2006; Hicken, 2011; Shin, 2015). In case of the PKS, it is found that the party inclined itself towards clientelistic strategy like other mainstream parties in Indonesia. However, the party still promoted programmatic strategy in urban-rich districts, which is more preferred by the voters.

Indonesian Politics and the Emergence of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)

When popular protests brought down Suharto's three-decade-old New Order regime (1967-1998) in May 1998, the nation held its first openly contested general elections (1999) since 1955, with 48 parties competing for seats in national and provincial legislatures (Thompson, 1999, p. 2). Since 1999, fair and just elections have been held at national level every five years, thus demonstrating the progress of Indonesian democracy. Although democratic elections take place peacefully, party-voter linkage has remained clientelistic; politicians and parties still provide tangible goods, cash transfers, and jobs in return for electoral support.¹ In addition, political corruption is still one of the biggest problems in Indonesian politics.² One exception to the existing structure is the PKS, which was highly programmatic at the very first years.

The party's origins can be traced back to the university campus movements of the early 1980s, known as 'Jemaah Tarbiyah' (the Education Movement), which later formed the Partai Keadilan (Justice Party - PK) in 1998. Inspired by the Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, the Tarbiyah Movement gained prominence among university students at a time when other oppositional

activism was restrained during the Suharto regime (Hamayotsu, 2011; Robison & Hadiz, 2004). The party's solidity is inherited from the Tarbiyah Movement and its network of members, who, after the movement, transformed into a political party, and were ready to work as an effective political machine for elections (Hidayat, 2012; Permata, 2008, p. 26). Party organization and membership is very important for the PKS. According to Ali Sera Mardani, chairman of the PKS and electoral strategy coordinator, party has around 450,000 members as of 2016. Members of the PKS were highly disciplined and committed to party ideology, and thus there was hardly any factionalism within the PKS (Tomsa, 2012). The party's discipline and organization made it attractive in urban areas, although in rural areas the party's performance was weak. However, a recent study (Park, 2021a, p. 463) revealed that "since the 2009 legislative election, the party also had gradually lost votes from educated Islamist voters, the party's original constituency".

In 1999 Legislative Elections the PK won only 1.36% of the votes in the 1999 elections, meaning that it failed to pass the electoral threshold. Indeed, according to constitutional law for parties running in the 2004 elections, the party had to change its name to PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) in 2002. The election results forced the party leadership to adopt a moderate Islamic view and the party "moved from being an avowed Islamist party to having post-Islamist traits" (Bubalo et al., 2008, p. 51). Islamic values were the primary concern for the movement at the beginning, but when the political formation emerged under the PK, corruption and nepotism in the politics of Indonesia became primary issues to fight against rather than Islamic concerns. After the elections, a new cabinet was formed by Megawati (PDI-p). Despite Megawati's coalition offer to the PK leadership, the party rejected the offer and remained in the opposition until 2004.

When the PKS became the opposition, the party was deprived of state resources. In fact, given that the PKS's electoral campaigns are based on voluntary activity, the party does not need an abundance of resources. In addition, the movement's transformation into a political party in 1998 did not automatically change its organizational character (Hidayat, 2012). During the 1999-2004 period, the party tried to extend its base of support by appealing to urban rich voters who demand clean politics and complain about corruption. The party's specific strategy in the urban areas gave rise to electoral success, and with 25.5% of the vote the party became the winner of Jakarta.

The PKS in the Opposition (1999-2004)

North Jakarta

Party organization was small and party pursued a less programmatic vote mobilizing strategy; party members depended on policy promotions and they tried to distribute tangible benefits (small gifts, food etc.) to voters. On special days, such as during Ramadan, the party offered free public feasts (public dinners for the poor) and party members provided services such as food and clothes after the flood disasters. During party activities, the party mainly focused on clean politics, anti-corruption, and the role of Islam in daily life. However, this strategy was not enough to extend support in a district where the clientelistic practices are rampant.³ Following this, and just like the majority of political parties, PKS candidates and politicians distributed basic necessities such as sugar, rice or oil (groceries, also known as 'sembako') during election campaigns.⁴

Another strategy of the party members is to hold meetings (3-4 times a year) with the head of villages and they discuss about local problems. However, most of the problems need financial resources. Also, as mentioned above, voters in less-developed districts generally expect groceries, small gifts, snacks or basic ingredients,⁵ but party members lacked resources and they also tried to refrain from distribution of money. Party activists tried to find alternatives and they solved

some problems through local companies in some occasions. For instance, regarding construction of buildings or restoration of some facilities, members negotiated with local companies by giving proposals, or they visit school departments for delivering local demands such as more facilities for the school children.⁶

Party headquarter did not finance the branch, rather than membership dues, party deputies and members' donations compensate the costs of the district. Because of lacking resources, party branch acted strategically when they carried out the electoral campaigns. They focused on specific areas (neighbourhoods) with high possibility of winning the majority. In some areas party organization targeted thousands of voters and point to the 1% to get local people as a bridge between the party and voters. Voluntary-based door-to-door strategy increased vote share in the district but compared to South Jakarta, the party remained weak in the district. Despite the PKS candidates distributed tangible benefits, because of the electoral competition, the candidates' efforts seem to remain weak compared to other Islamic and secular parties. Through the end of the 1999-2004 period, PKS could garner huge support from South Jakarta but same success could not be achieved in the North.⁷ In the 2004 Legislative Elections, PKS received 28% of the vote in South Jakarta, whereas party received 18% of the vote in North Jakarta (KPU [Komisi Pemilihan Umum] DKI Jakarta, 2016)

There are two reasons why the PKS could not increase its vote share as they did in urban districts. First, the party had lacking financial resources;

“Average voters in North Jakarta are economically low; their hope is the economic improvement. However, due to the low educational background and lack of political insight, for them, what was presented by the political parties during the campaign is what matters the most. Most of them are still easily fooled and bought with a good deal of money or other materials. There was really lack of goods distribution from the PKS because we had limited funds. Even if we did so, such activities were only to attract people to come to a place, that's where we provided information.”⁸

Secondly, the PKS' clean politics, anti-nepotism and anti-corruption campaigns did not receive support as it did in urban rich areas. Voters in the districts were more likely to give support for the politicians who take care of personal problems. Generally, candidates of less-developed districts need abundant financial resources or high personal reputation, so that he/she needs less distributive efforts because of popularity. The most important strategy for the candidates is the timing of distribution, through the last day or days of elections to make voters to remember the candidate. Otherwise, voters may give up supporting the candidate who provided goods during the electoral campaign.⁹

South Jakarta

In this period party members were very active in urban rich areas including South Jakarta. For the 2004 legislative elections, party members carried out two strategies for attracting voters. First, party members held regular meetings with the voters. During these meetings, active members listened voters' problems, complaints about national politics, and members detected local problems in the districts where the meetings were held. “Local problems differed based on each sub districts' conditions, to give some examples; in one sub district the main problem can be the collection of the garbage, and in another district voters may complain about lack of secondary schools”. In this situation party members offer school management or local authorities to establish a secondary school or they collect money for building a new one. These meetings were reported to the party leadership regularly. Secondly, after long evaluations among party members, the PKS determined its campaign strategy. For the 2004 elections, the party's campaign named ‘clean

and caring'. Party shifted its focus other issues such as upholding high moral standards, political reform, creating more community services, and increasing socio-economic equality (Fealy, 2010). In the 2004 legislative elections, when the PKS won in Jakarta with 25.5% of the vote (Collins & Fauzi, 2005), this strategy worked effectively, especially among the districts where middle and high income voters resided. Despite some corruption cases involving PKS politicians (during government periods), which weakened the party in urban districts of Jakarta, the PKS has been able maintain strongholds in Jakarta, and especially in the South (Miichi, 2014).

“PKS cadres were relatively well-educated, it is not really difficult to promote ourselves. Even if we need electoral support from the outside, we always re-think about the costs that we have to spend. Rather than spending money for that, we prioritize the internal party needs. We still have many creative ways that we can present to the public, rather than depending on money.”¹⁰

As indicated above, the PKS relied on voluntary-based campaigns mostly in urban areas of Jakarta. During election times, it was mostly the PKS candidates who paid for the necessary costs, such as party flags and flyers. In general, PKS members have a different approach when the issue is party financing, because the amount of expenses depends on the type of activity. For instance, members sometimes gather some amount of money and finance the daily expenses of voters. They explain this situation as ‘to serve the society’. “We do not hesitate helping other when it is needed; we are here for serving the interest of local people. When someone has problem, we try to solve it”.¹¹

The PKS in the Government (2004-2009 and 2009-2014)

In the 2004 legislative elections, the PKS gained 7.34% of the vote, even surprising the party members. A study suggests that “about 60-70% of the PKS’s ‘new votes’ had come from electors dissatisfied with other Islamic parties, such as the PAN and the PPP, and about 20-30% were from previous supporters of secular nationalist parties who were attracted to the PKS’s welfare activities and clean, reformist image” (Bubalo et al., 2008, p. 60). The election results encouraged party leadership. After the Presidential Elections in 2004, the PKS became part of a coalition under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. However, it is a fact that the PKS was desperate to be involved in the Yudhoyono government, with the party have already announced itself close to the centre. First of all, the PKS, as a new party, has to gain experience within the coalition, even if it is criticised for supporting the government’s policies. Secondly, the PKS has to break the common belief that an Islamic party may have another agenda concerning corruption, economic, and social problems; it must also show that the party can work with secular parties. The party leadership also realized that not only Islamists but also secular voters supported the party (Liddle & Mujani, 2009, p. 7). To show their sincerity, the party went even further and in some of the provinces, such as Tana Toraja (Sulawesi) and West Papua, the PKS has even fielded Christian Parliamentary candidates (Noor, 2011), and nominated candidates from non-Muslim or non-Tarbiyah backgrounds; indeed, this undermines the party’s disciplined Islamic identity (Tomsa, 2012) and shows a rise in pragmatism.

When in the governing coalition, the PKS pursued an effective strategy for increasing its base of support in poor rural and urban areas. The party extended social services at these provinces in order to develop party-voter linkage. These social services include free health care and check-ups, Islamic education for citizens and children, the provision of food on special days (Ramadan), and counselling services (related to marriage and parenting). The party leadership decided to establish

sub district offices all around Jakarta. The plan was for these offices to be active all year round and provide services for the society. While offering these services, the PKS worked in corporation with Islamic charity organisations that it was close to, such as the PKPU Foundation (Yayasan Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat) and the Zakat House (Rumah Zakat).¹² In fact, the PKPU was the social wing of the PKS, although in 2001 the organization became autonomous. The PKPU has been recognized both by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Religious Affairs; this enabled the organization to access the government's social programmes and to collect zakat (Latief, 2013). However, Islamic charity organisations, despite their social services, are used by political parties while they are building the clientelistic party-voter linkage; and the PKS stands dubious at this point. In 2013, Lutfi Hasan Ishaq (president of PKS) was involved in corruption and accused of graft and money laundering (Jakarta Post, 2013). "The PKPU and Rumah Zakat gained privileges to import beef from Australia from 2010 until 2013, and these organizations have organized the distribution of Qurban meat for the poor by importing the meat from Australia. The PKPU as a 'social' organization received license from the Ministry of Agriculture, Sarwono (PKS member) to import beef, but then the Directorate of Customs and Excise (Direktorat Jenderal Bea dan Cukai), the Ministry of Finance, found that the license expired" (Latief, 2013, p. 351). This example shows that the PKS is also involved in money politics and patronage while trying to extend its base of support.

North Jakarta

North Jakarta branch pursued a more clientelistic vote mobilizing strategy in the government periods. Party members focused more on social service provision and distribution of tangible benefits (food, clothes etc.). Party tried to penetrate rural areas through Islamic organizations close to the party. They mainly provide free health check-up, free medicine, and education of Quran to the children. According to Ali Sera Mardani, the most important part of social services is to help these people. "Social service provision helps us to reach these people. In this system, we register every citizen who wants to receive social services. After registration, we know more about these people. We get access to these areas and visit them during the elections. However, it does not mean that they will vote for us."¹³

According to some PKS members in North Jakarta, distributive incentives are acceptable with respect to voter demands. They perceive the distribution as a way of serving the society.

"It is normal to distribute goods during or towards election, but for PKS this kind of activity is not done only during elections, but also a part of it. However, financially, it is different between being coalition and opposition. As coalition, we cooperate with government; we try to integrate with the government. PKS tried to be as useful as possible to the society. So, it has been a part of our tradition to serve the society... Along with the party's tagline 'to serve the society', the leader of the party has a mandate to serve the society, and to help society and achieve life prosperity."¹⁴ "We act realistic. If we have no energy, we do not make any movement. Sometimes, we facilitate cadres who personally want to distribute goods to the public in the form of material".¹⁵

Although they are not in favour of distribution, the positive return of voters might push them to involve in such practices.

"We do distribute attributes (flags, t-shirts, snacks, pamphlets etc.) to support the campaign for both candidates and parties. We also provide some facilities to the public. According to the data, the attributes that we distribute may vary compared to feedback we get. Out of 1000 attributes that are

distributed, 60 to 70% give a positive feedback to the party or candidates". "On special occasions, such as Ramadan, it has become PKS culture, both structurally and personally, to mingle with society, and hand out treats such as 'takjil' (snacks for Ramadan) while breaking the fast. Party deputies and candidates also rely on this practice (distribution of tangible benefits) and put a lot of effort into it."¹⁷

Local branches also provide educational and social services. "Through Kitab Kuning (Reading Quran) Competition, PKS sustainably maintain its relation with the society. This competition's goal is to enlighten the public that this tradition will make Muslim understand more about Islam. For women, there are activities called Rumah Keluarga Indonesia (a program for families) as well as development activity for cadres, known as TAK (Tarbiah Anak Kader, Children care centers).¹⁸ Other than religious activities, party branch maintains sport activities such as fitness training and jogging. "For us (PKS members), not only spiritual strength that matters, but we also should have physical strength. We think that God loves Muslims who are physically and spiritually strong."¹⁹

The PKS' penetration to poor districts, including North Jakarta, provided base of support on Islamic basis. Through the end of first government period, the PKS established (an organization linked with the PKS), 'Network of Integrated Islamic Schools' (Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu, JSIT) beginning from kindergarten to the secondary levels (Noorhaidi, 2009). Educational activities were supported by 'Nurul Fikri', which was organized by Tarbiyah activists, also works incorporation with the PKS.²⁰ Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah²¹ perceived this move as a threat to their presence because PKS began recruiting members from Muhammadiyah.

The PKS supporters generally consist of middle-class citizens. However, corruption cases and ideological debates led to a decrease in more developed areas such as South Jakarta. In the second government period, the share of higher- and middle-class, educated voters has decreased to 60-70%, and the party gained votes from less-developed areas and low-income voters (roughly 30-40% of votes).²² Indeed, this shows that PKS' sub district services garnered support and party is becoming popular among low-income voters.²³

Although PKS politicians complain about grocery sales made by other parties' candidates and money politics during electoral campaigns,²⁴ party carries out regular food sale since 2011. At the beginning the sale was not considered to be a permanent activity but after realizing the demand for the cheap sales, party continued to carry out sales regularly (every month) at sub districts offices of North Jakarta. Sub district offices carry out food sales (packages of food such as rice, sugar, oil, etc.) with cheaper price (half of the market price). These sales are made monthly and the ingredients are maintained by wealthy members, local cadres, and PKS deputies. In some occasions the PKS branch of North Jakarta sell cheap food as a local campaign. For instance, the local branch wanted to show a reaction against the increasing price of fuel which led to an increase in basic grocery prices in 2013.²⁵ The sale was carried out with a small lorry in Papanggo sub district (the expenses were covered by PKS Papanggo members). Furthermore, three candidates of the party engaged in distribution of tangible benefits for the 2014 Legislative Elections. According to the Electoral Commission of North Jakarta, M. Idrus, Achmad Rilyadi, and M. Arifin were reported as candidates who engaged in money politics (KPU Kota Jakarta, 2014). According to the report, these candidates distributed 'sembako' (packages of food), distribution of free health treatment during the campaigns, showing that PKS candidates involved in clientelistic strategy in North Jakarta.

South Jakarta

Unlike in North Jakarta, the party branch tries to mobilize citizens based on clean politics, anti-corruption, and sincerity between voter and the party. One of the most important issues

in Indonesian politics is the political corruption. The PKS increased votes because of strong stance against this problem. Before governing coalition, the PKS leadership set the strategy to campaign against the widespread corruption and promotion of clean politics. Compared to mainstream parties, the PKS' economic promotions regarding the demise of poverty also favored by urban rich voters. Especially swing voters supported the party in 2004 Parliamentary Elections (Noorhaidi, 2009). In districts such as South Jakarta, where people prefer policy-oriented parties, clean politics brought strong support for the PKS. Although PKS leadership does not rely on distribution of direct benefits such as foods or clothes, the candidates sometimes distribute such goods when voters needed. A research made by Harjanto (2012) on nationalist and Islamic parties' clientelistic practices shows that PKS politicians, like other nationalist secular and Islamist parties, engaged in distribution of basic necessities and groceries during election campaigns; distribution cash assistance to mosques and religious study groups in South and West Jakarta.

In some sub districts, party engages in food sales like in the North. The party members indicate that such kind of activities becomes necessary when voters require that. "Even in South Jakarta there are poor people who cannot buy necessary supplements easily. The PKS dedicates itself for serving the society and this activity is one of them."²⁶ Like in North Jakarta, local office organizes events during the Ramadan. Party members distribute food for the poor and organizes common 'Iftars' (dinners) to the public. Health services such as free medical check-up and free medicine are also provided by the sub district offices once or twice a year.

The PKS offices in South Jakarta organize regular meetings with party members (and new members) weekly. Compared to North Jakarta, party branch focuses more on Islamic discussions at sub district offices. Quran education is widespread in the PKS local offices and South Jakarta is no exception. In fact, majority of PKS sub districts resemble mosques and party members invite voters to these events as a way of promoting their Islamic views. These activities generally take place during weekends or around evening time during weekdays. The goal is to invite members and voters to these discussions. For students, party organizes Quran reading competitions. Also, Nurul Fikri, the schools of the PKS provides after-school education for the poor students. Like every activity of the PKS, the voters who join party activities, including food sales and free check-up services, are registered by the sub district offices. The registration provides connection between the party and voters. Generally, party members visit these voters during election campaigns and seek their electoral support.

Conclusion

The goal of this research was to show how voter demands and access to resources affect parties' strategy in developing democracies. It is argued that parties organize themselves and appeal to voters differently based on a district's socioeconomic condition. In rich urban areas, parties try to appeal to voters using policy-oriented strategies, whereas in poor rural and urban areas parties are more likely to pursue a clientelistic strategy. In Indonesia, the PKS remains still one of the most well-institutionalized parties. The party's organization is strong while it also has committed and well-trained members. During the opposition period, the party was almost a purely programmatic party. However, as the party became involved in the governing coalition, it shifted more towards a clientelistic strategy. In other words, the PKS was quite successful in diversifying electoral strategy portfolios in the selected districts. Especially in North Jakarta, sub district offices distributed tangible benefits such as food, clothes, and medicine during the service provision. Party tried to extend base of support with new sub district offices in North Jakarta and South

Jakarta. In the governing periods, party members started food sales in sub district offices. It may be that the party pursued a policy-oriented strategy in the rich urban South, but in North Jakarta the party shift was towards clientelistic practices. Some of these practices were also used in South Jakarta.

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Notes

1. Interview with Masington Pasabiru, deputy of Jakarta, PDI-p (Jakarta, 05.04.2016).
2. Interview with Victor Bangtilu Laiskodat, NASDEM Party (Nasional Demokrat) deputy chairman (Jakarta, 10.04.2016).
3. Author interview with Masington Pasaribu, PDI-p (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) member of DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, House of Representatives) (Jakarta, 04.04.2016).
4. Author interviews with Mursin Baharuddin, head of PKS Tanjung Priok sub district (North Jakarta) and Muhammad Nur Wahyudi, treasurer of PKS Tanjung Priok sub district office (Jakarta, 12.04.2016).
5. Masington Pasaribu interview.
6. Author interview with Dr. Ali Sera Mardani, PKS electoral strategy coordinator and head of youth (2015-2020) (Jakarta, 06.04.2016).
7. Ibid.
8. Author interview with Moh Abdury Syarif, head of PKS Pademangan sub district office (North Jakarta), and Omer Abdulrahman, secretary of PKS Pademangan office (Jakarta, 11.05.2016).
9. Author interview with Paulus Riady, NASDEM Partai (National Democrat Party) member of North Jakarta district (Jakarta, 13.04.2016).
10. Author interview with Omer Abdulrahman, secretary of PKS Pademangan office (South Jakarta) (Jakarta, 11.05.2016).
11. Ibid.
12. Zakat means Islamic charitable obligation.
13. Dr. Ali Sera Mardani interview.
14. Mursin Baharuddin and Muhammad Nur Wahyudi interviews. Author interviews with Mohammad Tohir, secretary of PKS North Jakarta district office and Ahmad Demiri, PKS head of recruitment in North Jakarta district office (Jakarta, 11.05.2016).
15. Moh Abdury Syarif and Omer Abdulrahman interviews.
16. Ibid.
17. Mohammad Tohir, Ahmad Demiri, and Omer Abdulrahman interviews.
18. Mostly party sub districts or mosques that are controlled by the PKS are used for these activities.

19. Mohammad Tohir and Ahmad Demiri interviews.
20. ‘Nurul Fikri’ works with the PKS while providing education to party activists or supporters but does not receive financial support from the PKS. Author interview with Moh Abdury Syarif and Omer Abdulrahman interviews.
21. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah are two largest Islamic organization in Indonesia which provides social services for the poor all around Indonesia.
22. Dr. Ali Sera Mardani interview.
23. Author interview with Ahmad Mardono, PKS leader of North Jakarta district (Jakarta, 06.05.2016).
24. Dr. Ali Sera Mardani and Masington Pasaribu interviews.
25. PKS News, Jakarta (05.08.2013). <http://pks-jakarta.or.id/warga-serbu-mobil-semako-murah-pks-papanggo/>
26. Author interview with Arif Seyfullah, PKS leader of Mampang Prapatan sub district, (South Jakarta) (Jakarta, 11.05.2016). Mursin Baharuddin, Muhammad Nur Wahyudi, Mohammad Tohir, and Ahmad Demiri interviews.

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