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International Area Studies Review
[ Article ]
International Area Studies Review - Vol. 29, No. 2, pp.183-202
ISSN: 2233-8659 (Print)
Print publication date 30 Jun 2026
DOI: https://doi.org/10.69473/iasr.2026.29.2.183

Cox Asks, China Answers: Advanced Technology and the Possibility of Counter-Hegemony

Kihyun Lee*
Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Correspondence to: *Email: lijixuan@hufs.ac.kr

Abstract

Unlike mainstream theories of hegemony, this study employs Robert Cox’s analytical framework from a critical theory perspective to diagnose how China is challenging the current technological hegemonic order and assess its potential as counter-hegemony. In material terms, China is securing key positions in the global technology supply chain through advanced technological development, expanding its influence in technology-related international organizations, and constructing a new technological governance system through China-centered international institutions such as the Digital Silk Road. Ideologically, China is simultaneously resisting and proposing alternatives to the existing Western-centered ideational framework. Notably, an increasing number of developing countries are adopting Chinese technology, intensifying institutional cooperation with China, and consenting to the alternative ideas China advocates. Taken together, despite certain limitations, China can be understood as being in the process of forming a counter-hegemony in the technological domain.

Keywords:

Robert Cox, Hegemony, Counter-hegemony, Technology, International order, U.S.-China hegemonic competition, China

AI Acknowledgment

Generative AI or AI-assisted technologies were not used in any way to prepare, write, or complete essential authoring tasks in this manuscript.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest in this research.

Funding

This work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund; and the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea[NRF-2020S1A6A3A04064633]

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