Your browser does not support the PubReader view.
Go to this page to see a list of supporting browsers.
International Area Studies Review
[ Article ]
International Area Studies Review - Vol. 27, No. 2, pp.180-195
ISSN: 2233-8659 (Print)
Print publication date 01 Jun 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.69473/iasr.2024.27.2.180

Abe Shinzo and Value-Oriented Diplomacy: Combining Global Norms and Domestic Ideology

Junghwan Lee*
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea

Correspondence to: *Email: factnnorm@snu.ac.kr

Abstract

The second Abe Shinzo Cabinet re-introduced value-oriented diplomacy, which was originally set up during the first Abe Cabinet (2006-2007), as Japan’s diplomatic doctrine. Value-oriented diplomacy was the foundation of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” during the second Abe Cabinet and continues to be a pillar of the Japanese government’s diplomatic approach after Abe. This paper examines how the Abe Cabinet’s value-oriented diplomacy has transformed the Japanese government’s history policy and how to link it with its change of Asian policies. According to value-oriented diplomacy, the Japanese government emphasizes the significance of democracy and human rights as the core principles of its diplomatic policy. Value-oriented diplomacy is the recent version of Japan’s effort to characterize Japan as a global normative leader, emphasizing human security norms. However, in real East Asian international politics, value-oriented diplomacy became a tool for confronting China and North Korea. Although the human security norm was mainly introduced in Japan’s diplomatic discourse in the mid-1990s by mild-conservative internationalists or progressives, it was taken over by hawkish conservative political leaders in the 2000s. By linking it with domestic “safety” values, they could transfer the substantial meaning of human security in Japan as an ideological principle for withstanding neighboring countries. This paper will track how Japan’s hawkish conservative political leaders could take over the human security norm, which is universally accepted in the democratic world, and mobilize it for the reinforcement of domestic conservative ideology in Japan.

Keywords:

Abe Shinzo, Historical Revisionism, Value-Oriented Diplomacy, Japan’s Conservativism

AI Acknowledgment

Generative AI or AI-assisted technologies were not used in any way to prepare, write, or complete essential authoring tasks in this manuscript.

Conflict of Interests

The author(s) declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Funding

The author(s) declare that there is no funding.

References

  • Acharya, A. (2001). Human security: East versus west. International Journal, 56(3), 442–460. [https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200105600304]
  • Arase, D. (1993). Japanese policy toward democracy and human rights in Asia. Asian Survey, 33(10), 935–952. [https://doi.org/10.2307/2645094]
  • Calder, K. E. (1988). Japanese foreign economic policy formation: Explaining the reactive state. World Politics, 40(4), 517–541. [https://doi.org/10.2307/2010317]
  • Campbell, K. (2016). The pivot: The future of American statecraft in Asia. Twelve. [https://doi.org/10.1355/cs38-3g]
  • Edström, B. (2003). Japan’s foreign policy and human security. Japan Forum, 15(2), 209–225. [https://doi.org/10.1080/0955580032000108397]
  • Edström, B. (2004). The Yoshida doctrine and the unipolar world. Japan Forum, 16(1), 63–85. [https://doi.org/10.1080/0955580032000189339]
  • Edström, B. (2007). The success of a successor: Abe Shinzo and Japan’s foreign policy (Silk Road Paper). Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program.
  • Eriksson, J., & Rhinard, M. (2009). The internal-external security nexus: Notes on an emerging research agenda. Cooperation and Conflict, 44(3), 243–267. [https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836709106215]
  • Green, M. (2022). Line of advantage: Japan’s grand strategy in the era of Abe Shinzō. Columbia University Press. [https://doi.org/10.7312/gree20466]
  • Hagström, L., & Gustafsson, K. (2016). Japan and identity change: Why it matters in international relations. In L. Hagström (Ed.), Identity change and foreign policy: Japan and its ‘others’ (pp. 1–22). Routledge.
  • Hattori, R. (2011). Nitchū kokkōseijōka: Tanaka Kakuei, Ōhira Masayoshi, kanryōtachi no chōsen [Normalization of Sino-Japan relations: Challenges of Tanaka Kakuei, Ohira Masayoshi, and bureaucrats]. ChūōKōron Shinsha.
  • Hook, S. W., & Zhang, G. (1998). Japan’s aid policy since the cold war: Rhetoric and reality. Asian Survey, 38(11), 1051–1066. [https://doi.org/10.2307/2645685]
  • Hosoya, Y. (2011). The rise and fall of Japan’s grand strategy: The “arc of freedom and prosperity” and the future asian order. Asia-Pacific Review, 18(1), 13–24. [https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2011.582677]
  • Hosoya, Y. (2013). Japan’s two strategies for East Asia: The evolution of Japan’s diplomatic strategy. Asia- Pacific Review, 20(2), 146–156. [https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2013.863825]
  • Hosoya, Y. (2024). Introduction: Japan and the reform of the liberal international order. In Y. Hosoya & H. Kundnani (Eds.), The transformation of the liberal international order: Evolutions and limitations (pp. 1–6). Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4729-4_1]
  • Hughes, C. W. (2009). Japan’s response to China’s rise: Regional engagement, global containment, dangers of collision. International Affairs, 85(4), 837–856. [https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00830.x]
  • Iokibe, M. (2014). Sengo Nihon gaikōshi [Diplomatic history of postwar Japan] (3rd ed.). Yūhikaku.
  • Kanehara, N. (2011). Senryaku gaikōgenron [A grand strategy of Japan for the 21st Century]. Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha.
  • Kato, K. (2007). Tsuyoi riberaru [Strong the liberal]. Bungei Shunjū.
  • Katsumata, H., & Shibuichi, D. (2023). Japan in the Indo-Pacific: Domestic politics and foreign policy. The Pacific Review, 36(2), 305–328. [https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2160795]
  • Kawachi, T. (2009). Chi no seiji: Seirankai to iu monogatari [The blurred politics: Story of Seirankai]. Shinchōsha.
  • Kingston, J. (2020). The emptiness of Japan’s values diplomacy in Asia. The Asia-Pacific Journal, 18(19), 5487.
  • Kitaoka, S. (2008). Jimintō: Seikentōno 38 nen [The liberal democratic party: 38 years of ruling party in Japan]. ChūōKōron Shinsha.
  • Kitaoka, S., Inoki, T., & Sakamura, K. (2010). Gurōbaru pureiyā to shiteno Nihon [Japan as a global player]. Enutitishuppan.
  • Koga, K. (2020). Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ question: Countering China or shaping a new regional order? International Affairs, 96(1), 49–73. [https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz241]
  • Lee, J.-H. (2012). The catharsis of masculine self-expression: Ishihara Shintaro’s maverick leadership. Review of International and Area Studies, 21(4), 61–92.
  • Lee, J.-H. (2019). Okazaki Hisahiko’s views on Japan’s security and history. Journal of Japanese Studies, 79, 75-100.
  • Lim, E. (2019). Characterizing Japan’s current diplomacy under Abe. The Korean Journal of Security Affairs, 24(2), 96–119.
  • Manyin, M. E. (2003). Japan-North Korea relations: Selected issues (CRS Report for Congress). Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
  • Midford, P. (2018). Abe’s pro-active pacifism and values diplomacy: Implications for EU–Japan political and security cooperation. In A. Berkofsky, C. W. Hughes, P. Midford, & M. Söderberg (Eds.), The EU-Japan partnership in the shadow of China (pp. 40–58). Routledge. [https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351172165-3]
  • Mochizuki, M. M., Porter, S. P. (2013). Japan under Abe: Toward moderation or nationalism? The Washington Quarterly, 36(4), 25–41. [https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.861709]
  • Morris-Suzuki, T. (2001). Truth, postmodernism and historical revisionism in Japan. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 2(2), 297–305. [https://doi.org/10.1080/14649370120068595]
  • Nakakita, K. (2014). “Jimintōseiji no hen”yō[Transformation of LDP Politics]. NHK Shuppan.
  • Nam, K. J. (2015). The 2002 DPRK-Japan Summit and the rise of Shinzo Abe. Critical Review of History, 112, 326-351.
  • Nihon Saiken Inishiatibu. (2013). Minshutō seiken: Shippai no kenshō (The DPJ Government: An Examination of Failure). Chuokoron Shinsha.
  • Okazaki, H. (2007). Kono kuni o mamoru tame no gaikōsenryaku [Diplomatic strategy for protecting this country]. PHP Kenkyūjo.
  • Ooshita, E. (2007). Koga Makoto no shin seikai: Hana to ryū [Koga Makoto’s new political world: Flower and dragon]. Bīsuto.
  • Ozawa, I. (1994). Blueprint for a new Japan: The rethinking of a nation. Kodansha.
  • Paris, R. (2001). Human security: Paradigm shift or hot air? International Security, 26(2), 87–102. [https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753191141]
  • Potter, D., & Sueo, S. (2003). Japanese foreign policy: No longer reactive? Political Studies Review, 1(3), 317–332. [https://doi.org/10.1111/1478-9299.t01-2-00002]
  • Pugliese, G. (2017). Japan’s Kissinger? Yachi Shōtarō: The state behind the curtain. Pacific Affairs, 90(2), 231–251. [https://doi.org/10.5509/2017902231]
  • Pyle, K. B. (2007). Japan rising: The resurgence of Japanese power and purpose. Public Affairs.
  • Rekishi KentōIinkai (Ed.). (1995). Dai Tōa Sensōno sōkatsu [Review on Great East Asia War]. Tendensha.
  • Samuels, R. J. (2008). Securing Japan: Tokyo’s grand strategy and the future of East Asia. Cornell University Press.
  • Samuels, R. J. (2010). Kidnapping politics in East Asia. Journal of East Asian Studies, 10(3), 363–396. [https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800003660]
  • Satake, T., & Sahashi, R. (2021). The rise of China and Japan’s ‘Vision’ for Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Journal of Contemporary China, 30(127), 18–35. [https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2020.1766907]
  • Shibuichi, D. (2005). The Yasukuni Shrine dispute and the politics of identity in Japan: Why all the fuss? Asian Survey, 45(2), 197–215. [https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2005.45.2.197]
  • Soeya, Y. (2005). Japanese security policy in transition: The rise of international and human security. Asia Pacific Review, 12(1), 103–116. [https://doi.org/10.1080/13439000500108208]
  • Solís, M. (2023). Japan’s quiet leadership: Reshaping the Indo-Pacific. Brookings Institution Press.
  • Suzuki, S. (2016). The rise of the Chinese ‘other’ in Japan’s construction of identity: Is China a focal point of Japanese nationalism? In L. Hagström (Ed.), Identity change and foreign policy: Japan and its ‘others’ (pp. 95–116). Routledge.
  • Tanaka, H. (2009). Gaikōno chikara [The power of diplomacy]. Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha.
  • Uchiyama, Y. (2007). Koizumi seiken: “Patosu no shushō” wa nani o kaeta no ka [Koizumi cabinet: What “passionate prime minister” changed]. ChūōKōron Shinsha.
  • Wada, H. (2009). Japan-North Korea relations—A dangerous stalemate. The Asia-Pacific Journal, 25(2), 1-12..
  • Wakamiya, Y. (2014). Sengo nanajūnen hoshu no Ajiakan [The conservative view of Asia in postwar 70 Years]. Asahi Shinbum Shuppan.
  • Yachi, S. (Ed.). (2011). Nihon no gaikōto sōgōteki anzen hoshō[Japan’s diplomacy and comprehensive security policy]. Wejji.
  • Yakushiji, K. (Ed.). (2012). Murayama Tomiichi kaikoroku [Memoirs of Murayama Tomiichi]. Iwanami Shinsho.
  • Yamasaki, T. (2001). KenpōKaisei: Dōgi Kokka O Mezashite [Constitional revision: Toward a moral state]. Seisansei Shuppan.
  • Yoshimatsu, H. (2012). Identity, policy ideas, and Asian diplomacy: Japan’s response to the rise of China. International Area Studies Review, 15(4), 359–376. [https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865912467181]
  • Yuasa, T. (2008). Consolidating “value-oriented diplomacy” towards Eurasia? The “arc of freedom and prosperity” and beyond. In C. Len, T. Uyama, & T. Hirose (Eds.), Japan’s silk road diplomacy: Paving the road ahead (pp. 47–65). Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program.