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International Area Studies Review
[ Article ]
International Area Studies Review - Vol. 28, No. 4, pp.361-382
ISSN: 2233-8659 (Print)
Print publication date 31 Dec 2025
DOI: https://doi.org/10.69473/iasr.2025.28.4.361

Strategy Optimization of Peripheral Nuclear States: Hybrid Modality Deterrence in Confronting Regional and Extra-Regional Threats

Jeong-Ho Lee*
Research Professor, North Korea Archive Center, Research Institute of Korean Studies, Korea University, Republic of Korea

Correspondence to: *Email: :jeongho_lee24@korea.ac.kr

Abstract

Peripheral nuclear states face distinct strategic and technological constraints when compared to the established nuclear powers. North Korea illustrates how such states can simultaneously adopt different nuclear postures towards distinct adversaries, calibrated to their respective threat profiles, through what may be described as a Hybrid Modality Deterrence model. Within this model, two posture types can be identified. The first, Systematic Central-Escalation, is directed against South Korea and relies on centralized command and calibrated escalation, including the option of first-use, to compensate for conventional inferiority. The second, Limited Retaliatory Response, is employed against the United States, whereby Pyongyang leverages Guam as a strategic hostage in the absence of reliable mainland strike capability. Taken together, these postures constitute a flexible and adaptive deterrent framework that may also provide useful insights for analyzing the nuclear behavior of other peripheral states.

Keywords:

North Korea’s nuclear strategy, Asymmetric deterrence theory, Hybrid modality deterrence, Systematic central-escalation, Limited retaliatory response

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to express sincere gratitude to the editor-in-chief for facilitating a smooth publication process and to the anonymous reviewers whose constructive feedback greatly enriched this research. In line with the highest ethical standards, the author declares that this article makes minimal use of empirical data from the author’s PhD thesis submitted to King’s College London. The author affirms that all research ideas, theoretical development, data collection, analysis, and interpretation presented in this article are entirely original. The author also acknowledges the use of the generative AI tool ChatGPT (OpenAI, GPT-5) solely for refining English expressions.

AI Acknowledgment

Generative AI or AI-assisted technologies were not used in any way to prepare, write, or complete essential authoring tasks in this manuscript.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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