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International Area Studies Review
[ Article ]
International Area Studies Review - Vol. 27, No. 4, pp.464-486
ISSN: 2233-8659 (Print)
Print publication date 31 Dec 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.69473/iasr.2024.27.4.464

Domestic Turmoil and Diversionary Hypothesis: A Linear Relationship?

Weidong Zhang*
Department of Criminal Justice and Security Studies University of Texas at El Paso, USA

Correspondence to: *Email: wzhang3@utep.edu

Abstract

Why do individual case studies reveal evidence in favor of diversionary behavior by states, yet quantitative studies often produce many mixed results? In this paper, I help to explain this puzzle by arguing that there is a curvilinear relationship between internal conflict and external diversionary behavior as opposed to a linear one. By looking at contentious issues mainly in the Western Hemisphere from 1962 to 2001 using data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project, I find that countries with moderate levels of domestic unrest are most likely to initiate a militarized interstate conflict. Furthermore, I find that in times of elite unrest, states are more likely to have diversionary behaviors. In contrast, mass unrest is unlikely to incentivize states to use foreign policy adventures to rally domestic support. Such a finding helps deepen our understanding of the complex conditions leading to diversionary actions.

Keywords:

Domestic turmoil, Diversionary hypothesis, Curvilinear, Dispute initiation

AI Acknowledgment

Generative AI or AI-assisted technologies were not used in any way to prepare, write, or complete essential authoring tasks in this manuscript.

Conflicting interests

The author(s) declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Funding

The author(s) declare that there is no funding.

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