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International Area Studies Review
[ Article ]
International Area Studies Review - Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.238-249
ISSN: 2233-8659 (Print)
Print publication date 01 Sep 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.69473/iasr.2024.27.3.238

Embracing Clientelism: The Case of the Prosperous Justice Party in Indonesia

Kerem Kılıçdaroğlu*
Department of Political Science and International Relations, TED University, Ankara, Turkey

Correspondence to: *Email: kerem.kilicdaroglu@tedu.edu.tr

Abstract

This study aims to explain how political parties’ electoral strategy portfolios diversify from clientelistic to programmatic strategies. In this regard, key question includes: how socioeconomic differences among the electoral districts affect the organization and electoral portfolios of party branches? Based on field research in Indonesia (Jakarta) concerning party-voter linkage, I argue that parties’ access to state resources and voter demands affect party strategies’ portfolios. Parties organize themselves and appeal to voters differently based on a district’s socioeconomic condition. In rich urban areas, parties try to appeal to voters using policy-oriented strategies, whereas in poor rural and urban areas parties are more likely to pursue a clientelistic strategy. The research is based on a field research in North Jakarta (socioeconomically less-developed) and South Jakarta (socioeconomically more developed) with a particular focus on the Prosperous Justice Party’s (PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahterah) electoral strategies in these districts during opposition (1999-2004) and governing (2004-2009 and 2009-2014) periods.

Keywords:

Clientelism, Indonesian politics, Prosperous justice party, Political party strategy, Political party organization, Voter demands

AI Acknowledgment

Generative AI or AI-assisted technologies were not used in any way to prepare, write, or complete essential authoring tasks in this manuscript.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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