Your browser does not support the PubReader view.
Go to this page to see a list of supporting browsers.
International Area Studies Review
[ Article ]
International Area Studies Review - Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.197-218
ISSN: 2233-8659 (Print)
Print publication date 01 Sep 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.69473/iasr.2024.27.3.197

U.S. Technological Decoupling from China: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation

Yue Wu* ; Jae-seung Lee ; Kevin Tangonan
School of Digital Economics and Management, Software Engineering Institute of Guangzhou
Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Pukyong National University, Busan, Republic of Korea
Hawaii Yuhak Education Consultancy, LLC

Correspondence to: *Email: ktangonan@pusan.ac.kr

Abstract

The ongoing competition between the United States and China has upgraded to technological decoupling (TD). This paper analyzes the evolution of the U.S. TD policy toward China since the Bush administration and the reasons for the policy changes. With neoclassical realism, this paper defines the distribution of technological power as the independent variable and the U.S. threat perception of China as the intervening variable. It finds that although China’s technological strength has gradually increased, imposing systemic pressure on the United States, the U.S. TD policy depends on the extent of the U.S. threat perception of China. As the United States defines China from a collaborator to a competitor and a challenger, its TD policy has gradually evolved to work with its allies and partners to contain China multilaterally, aiming to reshape the world’s technology supply chain. Based on these findings, the United States is expected to adopt a more stringent TD policy against China, but the policy’s effectiveness remains uncertain.

Keywords:

Technological decoupling, U.S.-China competition, Technological power, Threat perception, Neoclassical realism

AI Acknowledgment

Generative AI or AI-assisted technologies were not used in any way to prepare, write, or complete essential authoring tasks in this manuscript.

Conflict of Interests

The author(s) declare that there is no conflict of interest. (If there are conflicts of interest, list them in detail, specifying the nature of the conflict and the involved parties.)

Funding

The author(s) declare that there is no funding.

References

  • Bateman, J. (2022). U.S.-China technological ‘decoupling’: A strategy and policy framework. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/25/u.s.-china-technological-decoupling-strategy-and-policy-framework-pub-86897
  • Beckley, M. (2018). The power of nations: Measuring what matters. International Security, 43(2), 7–44. [https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00328]
  • Bicheno, S. (2020). Chinese vendors continue to gain share in the global telecoms equipment market. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.telecoms.com/enterprise-telecoms/chinese-vendors-continue-to-gain-share-in-the-global-telecoms-equipment-market
  • Capri, A. (2020). Strategic US-China decoupling in the tech sector. https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/wp/tech/us-china-decoupling-tech, /
  • Cardwell, D. (2014). U.S. imposes steep tariffs on Chinese solar panels. Retrieved November 21, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/business/energy-environment/-us-imposes-steep-tariffs-on-chinese-solar-panels.html
  • Chen, W., & Li, J. (2019). Estimating the scale of relocation of labor-intensive manufacturing from China: Facts and potentials. The Institute of New Structural Economics at Peking University.
  • Cheng, R., & Wang, K. (2019). Telangpu yu aobama keji zhengce quxiang duibi [A comparative analysis of Trump and Obama’s science and technology policy orientations]. Quanqiu Keji Jingji Liaowang, 34(7), 1–6.
  • Chi, Z. (2020). Mieguo duihua keji ezhi zhanlue de shishi yu zhiyue [The U.S. technology containment policy against China: implementation and constraints]. Taipingyang Xuebao, 28(6), 27–43.
  • Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology. (2012). China science and technology newsletter. Retrieved April 6, 2024, from https://en.most.gov.cn/newsletters/2012/201205/t20120509_94251.htm
  • Chinese State Council. (2015). Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa <Zhongguo zhizao 2025> de tongzhi [Notice of the state council on the issuance of made in China 2025]. Retrieved November 29, 2022, from http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/19/content_9784.htm
  • Chinese State Council. (2021). Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan yinfa <Guojia biaozhunhua fazhan gangyao> [The CPC Central Committee and the state council issued the outline of national standardization development]. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-10/10/content_5641727.htm
  • Diao, D., & Wang, L. (2020). Zhongmei guanxi zhong de ‘tuogou’: Gainian, yingxiang yu qianjing [“Decoupling” in the China-U.S. Relations: Concept, Influence, and Prospect]. Taipingyang Xuebao, 28(7), 12–27.
  • Feng, J. (2022). The costs of U.S.-China semiconductor decoupling. Retrieved March 1, 2023, from https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/costs-us-china-semiconductor-decoupling
  • GovInfo. (2007). America competes act. Retrieved November 20, 2022, from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-110publ69/html/PLAW-110publ69.htm
  • He, K., & Feng, H. (2023). International order transition and US-China strategic competition in the Indo pacific. The Pacific Review, 36(2), 234–260. [https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2160789]
  • Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). The rise of China and the future of the west: Can the liberal system survive? Foreign Affairs, 87(1), 23-37.
  • Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding. (2022). Zhongmei renwen jiaoliu jizhi [Institution of China-U.S. People-to-people Exchange].
  • Johnson, K., & Gramer, R. (2020). The great decoupling. Retrieved November 13, 2022, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/14/china-us-pandemic-economy-tensions-trump-coronavirus-covid-new-cold-war-economics-the-great-decoupling, /
  • Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. (2022). Miguk-eui chabyeoljeok jeongicha seaekgongje-e daehan uryeo jipjung jegi [Concerns about discriminatory electric vehicle tax credits in the United States]. Retrieved April 6, 2024, from https://www.motie.go.kr/kor/article/ATCL8764a1224/155118176/view
  • Krishna-Hensel, S. F. (2017). Technology and international relations. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. [https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.319]
  • Kwan, C. H. (2020). The China-US trade war: Deep‐rooted causes, shifting focus and uncertain prospects. Asian Economic Policy Review, 15(1), 55–72. [https://doi.org/10.1111/aepr.12284]
  • Lang, P. (2021). Shuzi shidai meiguo duihua keji jingzheng de tedian [U.S.-China tech competition in the digital age]. Zhanlue Juece Yanjiu, 3, 85–100.
  • Lee, C. (2023). Decoupling from China is not so easy for Japan and Korea. Retrieved March 13, 2023, from https://www.9dashline.com/article/decoupling-from-china-is-not-so-easy-for-japan-and-korea
  • Lee, J., Kim, S., & Park, H. (2022). A new Cold War? U.S. strategic transitions and China’s diplomatic turnovers amid escalating bilateral tensions. Journal of China Studies, 25(3), 105–126. [https://doi.org/10.20288/JCS.2022.25.3.105]
  • Li, M., & Gu, Y. (2022). Jishu hezuo yu tongmeng yali: Meiguo duihua keji zhicai zhong meiguo mengyou de zhengce xuanze [Technical cooperation and alliance pressure: The policy choices of U.S. allies in U.S. technology sanctions against China]. Dangdai Yatai, 2, 115–141.
  • Li, Z. (2020). Meiguo tuidong zhongmei keji ‘tuogou’ de shenceng dongyin ji changqi qushi [Motivations and long-term trends of the U.S. technology decoupling strategy]. Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, 1, 33–40.
  • Ling, S., & Luo, J. (2021). Baideng zhengfu de ‘jishu lianmeng’: Dongyin, neirong yu taozhan [The Biden administration’s technology alliance: Motivations, content and challenges]. Guoji Luntan, 23(6), 3–25.
  • Liu, F. (2023). Balance of power, balance of alignment, and China’s role in the regional order transition. The Pacific Review, 36(2), 261–283. [https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2160791]
  • Lobell, S. E. (2009). Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: A neoclassical realist model. In S. E. Lobell, N. M. Ripsman, & J. W. Taliaferro (Eds.), Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy (pp. 42–74). Cambridge University Press. [https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511811869.002]
  • Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). The tragedy of great power politics. WW Norton & Company.
  • New York Times. (2023). Inside Taiwanese chip giant, a U.S. expansion stokes tensions. Retrieved March 12, 2023, from https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/22/technology/tsmc-arizona-factory-tensions.html?_ga=2.254160968.1190069354.1678251268-110657761.1655699634
  • Nocut News. (2022). Miguk, 7 jowonjjali hanguktuja galochaegatda [U.S. snapped 7 trillion won in Korean investment]. Retrieved February 23, 2023, from https://www.nocutnews.co.kr/news/5814014
  • PWC. (2017). China’s impact on the semiconductor industry: 2016 update. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/technology/chinas-impact-on-semiconductor-industry/assets/china-impact-of-the-semiconductor-industry-2016-update.pdf
  • Qiushi. (2023). Fahui guojia zhanlue keji liliang zhulijun zuoyong [We will give full play to the role of the main force of national strategic science and technology]. Retrieved April 5, 2024, from www.qstheory.cn/2023-09/13/c_1129860193.htm
  • Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, J. W., & Lobell, S. E. (2016). Neoclassical realist theory of international politics. Oxford University Press. [https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899234.001.0001]
  • Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. World Politics, 51(1), 144–172. [https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100007814]
  • S&P Global. (2019). A new great game—China, the U.S. and Technology. https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/featured/special-editorial/a-new-great-game-china-the-u-s-and-technology
  • ScienceNet. (2016). Di qi ci zhongmei chunagxin duihua zai jing juxing [The seventh China-U.S. innovation dialogue was held in Beijing]. Retrieved November 21, 2022, from https://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2016/6/348012.shtm
  • Semiconductor Industry Association. (2021). 2021 state of the U.S. semiconductor industry. https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/2021-SIA-State-of-the-Industry-Report.pdf
  • Shen, Y., & Mo, F. (2022a). Baideng zhengfu duihua keji jingzheng zhanlue [Biden administration’s science and technology competition strategy toward China]. Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, 9, 34–41.
  • Shen, Y., & Mo, F. (2022b). Zhongmei boyi beijingxia de meiguo duihua keji waijiao celue yanbian [The evolution of the U.S. science diplomacy strategy toward China under the background Sino-U.S. Competition]. Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu, 3, 83–115.
  • Taliaferro, J. W., Lobell, S. E., & Ripsman, N. M. (2009). Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy. In S. E. Lobell, N. M. Ripsman, & J. W. Taliaferro (Eds.), Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy (pp. 1–41). Cambridge University Press. [https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511811869.001]
  • U.S. Congress. (2020). U.S. China: Winning the economic competition, Part II. Retrieved April 6, 2024, from https://www.congress.gov/event/116th-congress/senate-event/LC65949/text?s=1&r=14
  • U.S. Congress. (2022). CHIPS and science act of 2022. Retrieved April 6, 2024, from https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346/text
  • U.S. Department of Commerce. (2012). Crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells whether or not assembled into moules, from the People’s Republic of China: Amended final determination of sales at less than fair value, and antidumping duty order. Retrieved April 6, 2024, from https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/12/07/2012-29668/crystalline-silicon-photovoltaic-cells-whether-or-not-assembled-into-modules-from-the-peoples
  • U.S. Department of Commerce. (2014). Commerce preliminary finds dumping of imports of certain crystalline silicon photovoltaic products from China and Taiwan. Retrieved April 6, 2024, from https://www.trade.gov/press-release/us-department-commerce-preliminarily-finds-dumping-certain-corrosion-inhibitors-china
  • U.S. Department of Commerce. (2022). EL popular. Retrieved November 21, 2022, from https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/consolidated-entity-list/1072-el-2
  • U.S. Department of Commerce. (2024). Entity list. Retrieved April 6, 2024, from https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-744/appendix-Supplement%20No.%204%20to%20Part%20744
  • U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). Science, Technology, and Innovation. Retrieved April 5, 2024, from https://www.state.gov/policy-issues/science-technology-and-innovation, /
  • U.S. Department of the Treasury (2018). Summary of the foreign investment risk review modernization act of 2018. Retrieved April 6, 2024, from https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/Summary-of-FIRRMA.pdf
  • Waltz, K. N. (2010). Theory of international politics. Waveland Press.
  • Wang, F., & Qu, B. (2013). Guoji guanxi lilun: Sixiang, fanshi yu mingti [Theories of international relations: Thoughts, paradigms and hypotheses]. Shijie zhishi chubanshe.
  • Wang, H. (2017). Lengzhan hou meiguo dui ‘zhongguo jueqi’ de renzhi yu duihua zhanlue [America’s reflection on ‘China’s rise’ and China policy after the Cold War]. Social Science Academic Press.
  • Wang, Y., & Shi, Y. (2018). Telangpu xingwei de genyuan: Renge tezhi yu duiwai zhengce pianhao [The root of Trump’s behaviors: Personality traits and foreign policy preferences]. Waijiao Pinglun, 1, 98–127.
  • Wang, Z., Ye, Y., Wang, Y., Xue, L., & Jiang, L. (2022). Big Y-intersections: 2022 global economic order report. Shanghai Institutes for International Studies.
  • Wei, Z. (2022). Diwei jiaolv yu meiguo duihua zhanlue jingzheng [Status anxiety and U.S. strategic competition with China]. Guoji Guancha, 3, 70–96.
  • White House. (2006). American competitiveness initiative. Retrieved November 20, 2022, from https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/aci/index.html#section6
  • White House. (2010a). U.S., China science and tech leaders convene on innovation. Retrieved November 20, 2022, from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2010/07/20/us-china-science-and-tech-leaders-convene-innovation
  • White House. (2010b). National security strategy. Retrieved November 24, 2022, from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf
  • White House. (2015). 2015 national security strategy. Retrieved November 29, 2022, from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf
  • White House. (2017). 2017 national security strategy. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
  • White House. (2020). Proclamation on the suspension of entry as nonimmigrants of certain students and researchers from the People’s Republic of China. Retrieved November 22, 2022, from https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-suspension-entry-nonimmigrants-certain-students-researchers-peoples-republic-china, /
  • White House. (2021a). Fact sheet: Quad leaders’ summit. Retrieved November 23, 2022, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-summit, /
  • White House. (2021b). U.S.-ROK leaders’ joint statement. Retrieved February 27, 2023, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement, /
  • White House. (2022a). United States-Republic of Korea leaders’ joint statement. Retrieved February 27, 2023, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement, /
  • White House. (2022b). 2022 national security strategy. Retrieved November 30, 2022, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
  • White House. (2022c). Fact Sheet: President Biden Signs executive order to implement the CHIPS and science act of 2022. Retrieved March 5, 2023, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/25/fact-sheet-president-biden-signs-executive-order-to-implement-the-chips-and-science-act-of-2022, /
  • Wu, Y. (2021). Hedging in international relations and its implications for China. Journal of China Studies, 24(2), 1–23. [https://doi.org/10.20288/JCS.2021.24.2.1]
  • Yan, X., & Sun, X. (2005). Zhongguo jueqi jiqi zhanlue [The rise of China and its strategy]. Peking University Press.
  • Yao, Y. (2021). The new Cold War: America’s new approach to Sino-American relations. China International Strategy Review, 3(1), 20–33. [https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-021-00071-1]
  • Yin, J. (2018). Telangpu de gexing tezhi dui meiguo duihua zhengce de yingxiang fenxi [President Trump’s personality and its impact on American policy toward China]. Dangdai Meiguo Pinglun, 2, 52–74.
  • Yoo, H. (2012). Domestic hurdles for system-driven behavior: Neoclassical realism and missile defense policies in Japan and South Korea. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 12(2), 317–348. [https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcs001]
  • Yu, Z., & Wang, J. (2022). Meiguo duihua jingmao de ‘tuogou’ yu ‘zaiguagou’: Sixiang yuanyuan yu xianshi luoji [Economic decoupling and recoupling in U.S.-China policy: Ideological origin and economic logic]. Guoji Zhanwang, 14(3), 97–114.
  • Zhai, M., & Li, Q. (2020). Telangpu zhengfu de duihua keji fangfan zhengce tanxi [Analysis of the Trump administration’s technology containment policies against China]. Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu, 4, 129–150.
  • Zhou, Q. (2021). Gaokeji lingyu de jingzheng zheng gaibian daguo zhanlue jingzheng de zhuyao moshi [Competition in the high-tech field is changing the main mode of strategic competition among major powers]. Taipingyang Xuebao, 29(1), 1–20.
  • Zhou, Q. (2022). Meiguo dui zhongguo keji ‘tuogou’ de zhanlue dongji ji zhengce cuoshi [Strategic motivation and policy measures of U.S. technology decoupling from China]. Taipingyang Xuebao, 30(8), 1–25.