

Article

Implementation of the Arctic Strategy by the EU's Arctic States and the Prospects

Hyuk Jeong* 

Polar Research Center, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Republic of Korea

Abstract

This article analyzes, and discusses the most recent EU's Arctic states' strategies towards their Arctic region, and draws 3 common strategy realms out of them, and presents the prospects for each of the 3 common strategy realms following further analyses and discussions relevant to the common strategy realms. The realms are climate change impacts and the responses, reinforcing security against Russia, and wellbeing of the indigenous people. It should be noted that cooperation among the EU Arctic states and other policy actors in the region, the Arctic Council, international agreements, non-EU states in the Arctic, observers to the Arctic Council, and the EU or non-EU organizations representing the indigenous in the Arctic, should be considered as prerequisite that underlies effective implementation of the primary policies in the EU's Arctic states' 3 common strategy realms. Last but not least, if it would be tough for the EU Arctic states to be engaged in given issues in the Arctic region with other policy actors even when taking that approach for solutions, then, it is invariably significant that the EU Arctic states endeavor to derive binding agreements concerned with the given issues, at least, among themselves if necessary, showing cohesiveness.

Keywords

EU, Arctic, Strategy, Climate change, Security, Indigenous

Introduction

Today, radical changes in environment and climate in the Arctic region are increasing the region's economic and geopolitical importance through natural resource development, air and sea routes extensions, and increased military activities. The changes are creating new challenges and opportunities for economy and people of the region. In particular, the Arctic states of the EU are faced with growing security threat of the region due to the ongoing Ukraine-Russia

Corresponding author:

* Email: hyeokjeong@hotmail.com

war. The security threat posed by Russia before the war is now becoming a harsh reality for the Arctic states. And as air and sea routes in the region are getting developed and extended because of development of natural resources, the strategies of the EU's Arctic states towards the Arctic are getting under serious review. Against the backdrop, this article analyzes and discusses the most recent EU's Arctic states' strategies towards the region, and draws 3 common realms of the strategies, and lastly, present prospects in each of the 3 common realms of strategy following further analyses and discussions relevant to the common strategy realms.

Literature Review

Thus far, there has been a set of published literature that discusses the EU's strategies towards the Arctic. However, there are few literatures that presents the prospects for the primary policy realms after analyzing and discussing the most recent EU Arctic states' primary policies that the EU Arctic states have transposed from the strategies. In particular, this article should be distinguished from the previous ones in a respect that it draws the prospects for each primary policy realms after analyzing and discussing the most recent policies that the EU Arctic states put in place at national level. The existing literature relevant to this article can be reviewed and summed up as follows:

An Article discussed primary policies and strategies of Arctic states towards the Arctic by country (Heininen et al., 2020). This article gives a general view of the Arctic strategies that each of the Arctic states presents. An article dealing with the EU's Arctic policies is published as well back in 2021 (Stępień & Raspotnik, 2021). And a research on the EU's policy for the EU's indigenous peoples has been conducted (Bodlund, 2019). While the article discusses the policies for the EU's indigenous peoples on one hand, it analyzes and discusses how the indigenous participates in the EU policy decision making process and how influential their voices are in the process on the other hand. A study discussed a few of challenges that the EU has faced with in achieving its policy goals outside its jurisdiction in the Arctic region (Lebel & Nilson, 2024). This study concludes that the Arctic states' politically prioritized issues and sector specified regulations are more influential than the EU level policies in the Arctic region.

A study that discusses the EU's capacity as a policy actor in the Arctic region was conducted (Jouhier, 2024). And a literature analyzes developments of the Arctic strategies by each Member state of the Arctic Council (Heininen, 2011). This literature gives a close-up perspective as to how the Arctic states' strategies toward the Arctic region have been established and what the developments have been until today.

A literature that was published back in 2020 discusses the EU's actorness in the Arctic region over the last decade in terms of security and geopolitics (Raspotnik & Stępień, 2020).

In addition, a published literature emphasizes the role of the EU stating that it is hard for international community to have geopolitical stability and to get disputes and conflicts to be resolved if it were not for the role of the EU (Koivurova et al., 2012).

There is a literature that accentuates the role of the EU in climate change and energy in the Arctic region (Dobson, 2018). This literature reiterates a perspective that the Arctic is an area where the EU should prevent the impacts of climate change and various energy resources are buried. Hence, the EU should strive to strike balance between the two sides.

A team of researchers discussed the need for cooperation between Nordic countries and the EU in implementing primary policies in the Arctic region and, the emphasis for the developments of the policies through the cooperation (Stępień & Koivurova, 2017).

As reviewed and discussed thus far, no literature regarding the prospects for each primary

policy realms from the EU's Arctic Strategy in the European Arctic region has been published up to now. And in that regard, this article is believed to be distinguished from the existing relevant literature in originality

The EU's Strategy for the Arctic

Recently, the EU has adopted a joint communication 'A stronger EU engagement for peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic' in 2021 (European Commission, 2021a; Lebel & Nilsson, 2024; Stepień & Raspotnik, 2021). The EU has set the 3 policy courses in terms of implementing the primary contents in the communication.

First, the EU is set to contribute to peaceful and constructive dialogue and cooperation maintenance in the changing geopolitical circumstances, and to raise the Arctic relevant issues through contacts with Non-EU arctic states. And it should strengthen regional cooperation, and enhance its strategic foresight for emerging security challenges in the 1st policy course. The growing security crisis caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine fundamentally underpins this policy direction. As part of the efforts, the EU has set up a representation office of European Commission in Nuuk to strength cooperation with Greenland (Commissione Europea, 2024; Polar Journal, 2024). And the EU is slated to increase its involvement with the Arctic Council working groups, and to reinforce cooperation among coastal areas by making the most of the EU's satellite systems called 'Galileo' (European Commission, 2021c). In particular, the EU is planning to intensify policy activities by holding regional forum and strengthening partnership between the European Arctic states so that it can protect its citizens and enhance its response capability to shoring up security of the coastal areas (European Commission, 2021a).

In the context, use of the EU satellite system, as a way to reduce the level of security threat posed by Russia on the European Arctic states, and cooperation with Arctic Council by strengthening cooperation with Greenland, are seen to require approaches of science technology and research. It can be said that the EU takes into consideration a policy activity of holding forum as part of its action plan in the perspective. And it can imply that the EU shows flexibility in developing partnership among the coastal areas with a non-binding but flexible approach through the policy activity of holding forum.

Secondly, the EU has set the strategy for the Arctic the way that it strengthens resilience from environmental degradation and climate change-induced impacts. Especially, it emphasizes the need to establish measures to reduce pollutants that affect air, land, and sea in the Arctic. And it urges the EU's Arctic states to lay out assertive measures against ocean waste and plastics, black carbon, chemicals, emitted pollutants in transportation, and unsustainable use of natural resources (European Commission, 2021a; Lebel & Nilsson, 2024). It can be plainly seen that it underscores arrangement of the measures to avoid ways that worsens the degraded environment caused by pollutants in sea, land, and air while restoring it simultaneously.

And the EU considers biodiversity reduction as the most urgent problem area in terms of environmental degradation attributable to climate change within and even beyond the Arctic (European Commission, 2021a, 2021b; Lebel & Nilsson, 2024). It is because climate change and biodiversity are interdependent, and high rising temperature stemmed from increase in emissions of greenhouse gases can accelerate creation and introduction of alien species into the existing ecosystem in terms of biodiversity, and can lead to extinction of the existing species and disturbance in food pyramid exacerbating biodiversity after all. Rich biodiversity in certain ecosystem of land, sea, or soil can be construed as meaning that the living creatures in that ecosystem interact very lively with one another in an organic way and each living creatures in

the food pyramid inside the ecosystem increases in number. It is considerably apparent that the phenomena facilitate organic interactions among the living creatures that compose the relevant ecosystem creating a virtuous cycle that increases biodiversity in that ecosystem.

Thirdly, the EU underlines well-being of the Arctic indigenous peoples in the strategy for the Arctic in the communication. The European Commission holds the Arctic Stakeholder's Forum and Indigenous People's Dialogue on a regular basis for the policy direction (European Commission, 2024; European Polar Board, 2022; Shubin & Rogachev, 2017; WWF, 2024). From the perspective, one can maintain that highly-engaged participation in decision making process in residential area of the indigenous helps themselves understand circumstances concerned with issues that they face and the chances are that it can enhance the effectiveness of the relevant policy in the end. In fact, the Arctic Dialogue has been assessed to help stakeholders have mutual understanding and information sharing in arctic relevant issues (Muhammad, 2012).

The EU strives to keep regular contact with the Sámi Council (European Commission, 2021a; SÁMIRÁÐÐI, 2024). The Sámi Council is a voluntary decision making institution for Sámi people, and is established to promote interests and rights of the Sámi that are living in Norway, Sweden, and Finland (Bodlund, 2019; European Commission, 2022). It can be regarded that the regular contact with the Sámi Council established to promote the rights of the Sami people should be effective measure to monitor the EU policy implementation in the Arctic region demonstrating the fact that the EU recognizes role of the Sami people in the region.

The EU provides support for culture of the Sami people running Interreg Northern Periphery Arctic Program as part of its cohesion policy. The EU's cohesion policy is designed to reduce imbalance and seek balanced development between regions within the EU.

Furthermore, it is indispensable for the EU to have the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to be reflected upon the EU's human rights policy (European Commission, 2021a). The declaration primarily deals with significant guidance for society ensuring rights and equality of the indigenous (United Nations, 2013).

As noted, the aforementioned policies are aimed at developing the residential area for the indigenous people and maintaining sustainability of the Sami culture. And it is not difficult to come to know that the EU applies the declaration to protect the fundamental human rights in the respect. In addition, the EU is planning to promote the rights of the Sami in line with International Labor Organization Convention No. 169 (European Commission, 2021b).

The provision 169 provides that the indigenous are entitled to enjoy non-discriminatory human rights in their lives, and are guaranteed to participate in decision making process that affects their lives (Larsen & Gilbert, 2020). It can be considered as policy that induces the Sami to do active participation in overall decision making process that affects their lives.

The Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region

Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Finland's strategic alignment with Europe gave weight to the concept of 'Northerners'. It was getting more significant for the government than the fact that it joined the European Union later on in 1995. And the Finnish government initiated 'the Northern Dimension' policy which reflected the concept in forming the external policy framework for the European Union, which the government finds incontrovertibly meaningful in terms of contributing to shaping the EU's external policy as it is. 'The Northern Dimension' policy was transformed into a joint policy that Iceland, EU, Norway and Russia joined after going through several times of revision. Hence, the concept of the 'Northerners' has been indubitably pivotal for the state in laying out policies towards the Arctic region (The Arctic Institute, 2023a).

Since the beginning of the 2000s, Finland has viewed itself entirely as an Arctic state in forming the Arctic relevant identity (Lähteenmäki, 2017). It can be said that it comes from the Finnish strong desire to firmly establish its ground in the Arctic region that is geographically and politically getting significant. Different stakeholders inside Finland agree to place a value on emphasizing the Finnish Arctic identity in its foreign policy (Väättänen, 2021). Viewing itself as an Arctic state and reinforcing its political position in the Arctic region where the other Arctic states have their own territories in part, should be from a critical standpoint that Finland strives to have competitive power, and to survive the cut-throat competition among the rivalries in the region. It is clearly evident that rich natural resources, increasing sea routes and airways, advanced ice-breaking technology, and the Sámi's rich cultural heritage underlie the strengthened position. These factors have been greatly contributing to the role of Finland in the Finnish political and economic matters in the Arctic region (The Arctic Institute, 2023a).

Developing and harnessing its natural resources along with establishing and increasing its sea routes and airways, making the most of its advanced ice-breaking technology, can offer Finland a strong economic edge. Its Sami's rich cultural heritage, apart from the economic side, can be seen as a big symbolic policy representing the Finnish Arctic stressing the aspect that the Finnish identity is the Arctic itself.

The Finnish Government adopted the Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Policy in 2021 prioritizing climate change mitigation and the adaptation, promotion of wellbeing and the rights of its indigenous people, the Sámi, establishing and extending infrastructure and routes of logistics, and leading expertise and cutting-edge research (Finland Strategy for Arctic Policy, 2021). And taking the leadership in the international Arctic Policy is another goal to be accompanied with the priorities in part (Väättänen, 2021). It can be explained that the Finnish government had additionally set the rights and wellbeing of the Sami as part of the objective of the strategy still focusing on economy, research, and opportunities of development in the previous strategy. In particular, the Sámi Climate Council had been established to allow for promotion of knowledge in the traditional decision making process linked with climate change policy for the Sámi (Finland's Strategy for Arctic Policy, 2021; Helsinki Times, 2023; Rovaniemi Arctic Spirit, 2023).

It is significantly meaningful in the respect that the government intends to transpose the regional-level climate change impact into a state-level climate change policy. It can be construed as official participation by the Sámi in state-level policy relevant to climate change. And the climate change impacts felt by the Sámi, for example, in reindeer grazing, can be greater than those that the ordinary feel. In that respect, it is considered that establishing such council should make an impact to wellbeing of the Sámi to some extent.

The Finnish government stresses the Russia's influence on the Arctic region, and reiterates the need to set up the response to it in its foreign policy. In particular, it has a view point that stability of the Arctic region is closely related to security situation in the Baltic Sea as well as the remaining Europe and it recognizes that the security crisis of the region has been heightened since the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula (Finland Strategy for Arctic policy, 2021). And the Annexation had triggered the Finnish government to bolster its tie with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) even before it joined NATO afterwards (Seyaz, 2024). As the geographical condition that Finland has a border with the Russian Federation, causes Finland to have its national security crisis, the instability in the Arctic region in terms of security can bring about security crisis to the entire European continent.

In response to it, the Finnish government has engaged in continuous bilateral or multilateral talks on its foreign and security policy as well as the defense cooperation regarding the Arctic security situations. As part of the efforts, the government has proposed and taken part in the

Arctic Council summit (Yle, 2010).

By participating this summit, Finland sees that it can raise environmentally urgent issues to the Arctic Council on one hand and it can hold forums to address security policy challenges that are well outside purview of the Arctic Council on the other hand (Finland Strategy for Arctic Policy, 2021).

It demonstrates a perspective that the Arctic Council has its limit in terms of role as an international forum, not as an international policy decision-making institution. Because it is plausible in that the government takes approach of international collaboration in resolving arctic environmental issues, and whereas it convenes the Arctic summit where heads of states, the supreme decision makers, attend to address the security relevant issues more delicate than the environmental ones. Finland has been consistently accentuating the role of the Arctic Council, and the importance of the strengthened European Union's Arctic policy. It views the EU as a crucial and constructive policy actor with capability of providing financial resources and gathering wide-ranging expertise on global level for its Arctic policy (The Arctic Institute, 2023a). Finland, a member state of the European Union, is obligated to transpose EU-level policy into its national policy and it can join various funds at the EU-level such as the aforementioned Structure Fund. It can be seen that Finland creates a structure enabling it to have little choice but to implement arctic policies in collaboration with the EU.

The Sweden's 2020 Strategy for the Arctic Region

After becoming a founding member of the Arctic Council back in 1996, Sweden started to address Arctic issues with the Council, especially on issues such as human rights, sustainable development and etc. Until then, the Scandinavian state treated its Arctic issues as domestic ones, particularly when it dealt with issues such as reindeer herding, Baltic seal hunting, and mining. And then, Sweden began to have its formal Arctic identity as it assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2011 and laid out its first strategy towards the Arctic region (The Royal Circle, 2020).

The Swedish government has been laying out 'the Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region' every 10 years since the year of 2011. The government put priority on policies of climate and environment, economic development, and human dimension in the first strategy in 2011 (Marchenkov, 2022; Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2011). The Swedish government released its 2nd strategy for the Arctic region in 2020 (Marchenkov, 2022). The most outstanding feature of the revised strategy is that the government added 'Security and Stability' to the existing strategy as one of 6 priorities. The government put it in the strategy as it took into consideration the status quo where Northern European states had their increased interests in economic value of the Arctic, and had growing tension stemmed from the increased alert against Russia due to Ukraine-Russia war. The priorities of the strategy are followings: international collaboration among actors in the Arctic, security and stability, climate and environment, polar research and environmental monitoring, sustainable economic development, business sector interests, and ensuring good living conditions (Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2020).

International Collaboration among Actors in the Arctic

As it views the Arctic Council as primary actor in terms of cooperation in the Arctic region, Sweden reiterates strengthened cooperation with the Arctic Council consisting of 8 Arctic states and 38 observers (Marchenkov, 2022). And it places importance on signing new agreements

designed for sustainable and stable development (Government Offices of Sweden, 2021; Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2020). Furthermore, the Swedish government calls on the EU to play as an economic, security partner for Sweden acknowledging the existence of the EU in the Arctic region (The Arctic Institute, 2021). The Swedish government proclaims that it will reinforce cooperation with Nordic countries, the indigenous people, and the Non-Arctic states for sustainable development with focus on scientific research area for environment and climate, and pushing ahead trade-related cooperation with Asian countries including China (Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2020). It can be said that the Swedish government recognizes the significance of cooperation with policy actors at multilateral level when it does policy activities in the Arctic Circle. Specially, it can imply that the cooperation with non-arctic states would make it possible for Sweden to address the Arctic relevant issues with them acknowledging the policy effectiveness of cooperation beyond the Arctic Circle.

Security and Stability

The Swedish government is planning to continuously build up its military forces to be operated in the northern Swedish and the neighboring areas. It intends to exert itself to develop and deepen the Nordic Euro-Atlantic Security and Defense policy cooperation with more concentration on the European Arctic region (The Arctic Institute, 2021).

The government confirms that it would contribute to border cooperation in the area of risk management, and to rescue service for civilians in the Arctic region. The government is set to work to maintain and increase its engagement with the EU and the Northern European states, and furthermore, to consolidate the transatlantic link (Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2020). It seems that Russia's threat to the security of the European Continent posed by its invasion to Ukraine would land the Swedish government to reinforce its security against Russia in its Arctic region.

Climate and the Environment

The government of Sweden has set out an ambitious plan to reduce net emissions of greenhouse gas to close to net zero by 2045 to slow down the impacts incurred from arctic warming (Government Offices of Sweden, 2021; Karlsson et al., 2020; Sandberg & Krook-Riekkola, 2022). Sweden is determined to be active in solidarity with the rest of the Arctic states and observers to accomplish the goal. And it calls for the measures to substantially abate global emissions of greenhouse gas at member state level within the EU and it pledges to do its utmost to implement them. Moreover, it has resolved to aim at taking the lead in responding to climate change and carrying out such a task (The Arctic Institute, 2019).

The Swedish government, in the strategy for the Arctic region, is planning to make joint efforts with various international organizations in securing biodiversity such as assessing environmental impacts on ocean and setting preservation area (Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2020). Suffice it to say that the policy course takes into consideration an aspect that various living creatures and their habitats are disappearing due to climate change impacts in the Arctic that is assessed to be unique and paramount in ecosystems on earth. In addition, to cope with a situation where dispersion of toxic materials and mercury within the Arctic environment are threat to human and wild animals, the Swedish government will support for arrangement of local responses such as control of marine waste including plastics mainly in collaboration with the Arctic Council (Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2020).

Polar Research and Environmental Monitoring

The Swedish government will support and develop international cooperation concerning polar research including research for climate change area. Additionally, the government is intent on encouraging researchers and the Arctic indigenous people to exchange their knowledge. And it will strive to make the most of both traditional knowledge and science research in the process. It is planning to continue to strengthen environmental monitoring, research, and observation systems within and around the Arctic (Swedish Polar Research Secretariat, 2020).

The Scientific Cooperation Agreement that the 8 Arctic states adopted went into effect in 2018. It guarantees scientific data to be shared among the signatories that is seemingly believed to be instrumental to the Swedish government's strategy (Pedersen, 2019). Sweden is providing a various platform such as Scientific Research Station in Abisko, the Swedish ice breaker of the Arctic Ocean in Odin, Polar atmospheric exploration satellite so that it is doing joint research with the U.S. and Germany, and is slated to deploy mid-sized carbon neutral exploration ship in the ocean (Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2020). One can see that Sweden is doubling down the establishment of legal system and infrastructure for scientific research that can support for the convergence of traditional and scientific knowledge in the field of Arctic studies.

Sustainable Economic Development and Business Sector Interests

As the world's interest in opportunities of investment and business for economic potential of the Arctic grows, the negative impacts on the Arctic's natural environment are increasing as well. Sweden is up to making use of the pace of international cooperation based on the European Green Deal for preservation of the Arctic's unique environment minimizing the detrimental impacts. Moreover, it is determined to use of natural resources from the region, and to minimize the relevant risks (Chuffart et al., 2021; Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2020; Polar Journal, 2024). It can be said that the policy is designed to minimize environmental risk in economic use of natural resource in Sweden, and it is obvious that it centers upon international cooperation.

Other than the policy course, the government of Sweden will reduce the environmental and climate impacts to a minimum level by fully mobilizing the Arctic related technology and resources focusing on the North East areas like the provinces of Norrbotten, Västerbotten. And simultaneously, it is pursuing to promote economic growth, employment, well-being, and sustainable development in the areas and it seeks to connect with international cooperation, businesses, academic institutions and the public sector for that purpose (Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2020). It is construed up as meaning that the economic use of natural resource underlies the development plan for certain areas by using the Arctic resources and the course displays policy cooperation in linkage with various policy areas.

Ensuring Good Living Conditions for the Indigenous

As the need for smart solution and the infrastructure highly increases in the Arctic that is sparsely populated, and as the residential areas are far distant among one another, the Swedish government is planning to develop and extend digital infrastructure based on high-speed internet or satellite communication (Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2020). It is plainly comprehensible that the government can manage the residents, and provide living surroundings of good quality for them by offering the IT based benefits. Meanwhile, the government is set to double down its efforts to encourage participation of women and policy development for both youth and the indigenous people, the Sámi, and to promote reindeer grazing and tourism for jobs so as

to keep the residents from seceding from the Arctic area to a minimum. For that objective, the government will arrange support policies in an array of areas such as education, employment, housing, security, culture through cooperation with the Arctic Council as well as the participation of experts (Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2020). It can be interpreted as a multilevel policy course because the objective is to somehow encourage participation of the marginalized in the policies relevant to their residential areas, and to promote development of the areas so as to address the area's problematic issues.

The Denmark's Strategy for the Arctic Region

The Kingdom of Denmark is composed of Faroe Island, Greenland, and Denmark. Currently, the Faroe Island and Greenland have their own self-governing government. The legislature and administration of the governments are independent of each other. It seems that the separation requires their mutual cooperation and joint strategy for the government to cope with opportunities and challenges in its Arctic territory. The Faroe Island and Greenland have established and run their own home rules since 1948 and 1979, respectively (Arctic Council, 2024). Thus, it is not too much to say that the Kingdom of Denmark has political diversity and cultural differences to a considerable degree inside. Having become chair of the Arctic Council between 2009 and 2011, it took the lead in implementing arctic policies at the level of the Arctic Council, and contributed to the development (Arctic Research Consortium of the United States, 2009). Having adopted the Nuuk Declaration at ministerial meeting in Nuuk in 2011, the government established the permanent office of the Arctic Council in Tromsø, Norway, and decided the roles and criteria for new observers to the Arctic Council (Arctic Council, 2011).

Given that an increasing number of countries around the world are getting involved in interests in the Arctic resources, and are making endeavor to secure the status of observer to the Arctic Council, and to promote the interests by using the status, the policy decision can't be more timely and meaningful. Additionally, the government set up the task force in its arctic territory to develop tools to manage and prevent potential oil leak. Ministers from the Arctic states at the ministerial meeting then, signed the binding agreement on Search and Rescue in the Arctic under the auspice of the Arctic Council (Arctic Council, 2011).

That is to say, by signing the agreement, the member states to the Arctic Council have been obligated to do their part for search and rescue in the Arctic. In that respect, it is not too much to say that the Arctic council went beyond its trait as international forum. And, it can imply that the chances are that the Arctic Council would sign another binding agreement in case of emergency in the future.

It is the 2007 Russian flag-planting on North Pole sea-bed that led the Danish Arctic strategy to become what it has become today. Before 2007, the state's Arctic policy primarily focused upon bilateral relationship with Greenland. And in the wake of the Russian flag-planting on North Pole sea-bed, the Danish policy makers started to realize the significance of forging regional relations (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2016).

Mindful of the importance, the Kingdom of Denmark laid out a detailed strategy in 2011 for the Arctic for the period of 2011-2020 (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2016). The strategy suggests 4 realms of policy. The realms are as followings: A Peaceful, secure and safe arctic, Self-sustaining growth and development, Development with respect for the Arctic's vulnerable climate, environment and nature, and lastly, Close cooperation with international partners (Heininen, 2012; Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, 2011).

The most prioritized and pivotal contents of the detailed in the strategy is that common

benefits from global agreements and local or global issues in terms of development of the Arctic region should go first to the country's citizens that live in the Arctic region (Heininen, 2012). The strategy is poised to pursue the development of resource, the right to the use, and the respect for their culture, tradition, lifestyle, and the promotion (Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, 2012). In particular, respect for the right to the use in developing the resources can be considered as a meaning that the profits from developing the resources should be used for developing the area so that the area should get more developed than the neighboring areas without the resources.

The Danish government, in the policy realm of 'A peaceful, secure and safe arctic', views that international laws and established cooperation forum provide a solid foundation for solutions of conflicts and more constructive cooperation. And it is in pursuit of offering active assistance in terms of future cooperation concerned with common challenges and new opportunities in the Arctic. It regards maritime safety as a significant priority policy area as harsh arctic weather conditions require not only local cooperation but also preventive measures including training and ship safety in search and rescue service in the Arctic region (Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, 2011). And the government puts importance on trust-building and cooperation with the Arctic partner countries (Heininen, 2012; Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2016).

As noted above, even though the Danish government set the cooperation with international partners as a comprehensive policy course separately, it displays an aspect that regional cooperation with the Arctic states, and the cooperation among the states are critical foundation for peace, stability, and safety in the region.

In the policy realm of 'Self-sustaining growth and development', the government pursues making use of international criteria application related to safety, health, environment, preparedness, response, and transparency of mineral resources, and furthermore, the return on profits to society. With mindful of the feasibility that use of renewables is expected to increase, the government claims to advocate for harvesting biological resources including marine mammals, fish and shellfish in a sustainable manner. Other than that, it reiterates the establishment of adequate regulation framework for export and investment, and the use of new opportunities in its arctic region in close collaboration with industry. And the government points to a policy direction that research on the Arctic by the government should be conducted at the forefront, and that the state-level efforts associated with research and training should be made to support for development of industry and society (Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, 2011). Encapsulated from the discussions above, it can be said that the government seeks to support for the way that biological resources are harvested sustainably and it take aims to increase generated power from renewables, and to link it with industry for development on the side of energy.

In the realm of 'Development with respect for the Arctic's vulnerable climate, environment and nature', the Kingdom of Denmark is poised to accumulate the climate change related knowledge and results on climate change for adaptation at global and local level. It underscores that the nature and environment should be managed on the basis of the best possible scientific knowledge and criteria (Heininen, 2012). And that international cooperation should be facilitated in that aspect (Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, 2011).

In this realm, the strategy shows the significance of understanding the outcome incurred from climate change, and the emphasis on the build-up of the relevant knowledge for adaptation to climate change. And it attaches importance to systematic collating of the research results and the long-time monitoring as well. It stipulates that protection of biodiversity on international criteria is of significance and the protection should be enhanced by identifying the ecologically vulnerable area (Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, 2011).

It should be noted that the management following identifying the ecologically vulnerable area should be a way to maintain the grade of biodiversity or to prevent degradation of biodiversity into the neighboring areas. The Danish government is expected to participate in protecting marine environment by implementing and ratifying the Protocol of Hazardous and Noxious Substances (International Maritime Organization, 2010) on liability and compensation for damages incurred from harmful and hazardous substances in the Arctic region (International Maritime Organization, 2010). And the government will join the Ballast Water Management Convention (ClassNK, 2021) so as to protect marine environment from invasive species (Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, 2011). It is understandable that protection of marine environment from harmful substances is concerned with protection of marine biodiversity. And joining the Ballast Water Management Convention and implementing it should be regarded as a measure designed to prevent and protect the disturbance of local ecological system from invasive species from oversea ships.

In the realm of ‘Close cooperation with international partners’, the Danish government prioritizes global cooperation relevant to the Arctic in the fields such as climate change, protecting natural environment, and applying strict international maritime criteria. It puts high level of priority on the rights of the indigenous as well. In particular, it emphasizes the cooperation with the Arctic Council and the European Union (Heininen, 2012). And the government is set to maintain the cooperation with new partners and the existing partners to upgrade dialogues and bilateral cooperation on the Arctic to protect its interests when it comes to security (Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, 2011).

As discussed thus far, the Danish strategy toward the Arctic region shows that the policies in climate change, environment protection, security and promotion of the rights of the indigenous, need to be implemented through multilateral cooperation. And continuous engagement and bilateral talks of and between the involved countries, and the cooperation, should come before anything else so as to implement the concrete policies.

The Discussions of the Primary Polices for the 3 Common Strategy Realms in the EU’s Arctic Region

As discussed and encapsulated up to now, and considering the fact that the EU’s Arctic states are obligated to transpose the EU level policy into national ones, the primary strategy realms can be summed into the following 3 strategy realms. The following 3 strategy realm are arranging climate change mitigation policies, reinforcing the Arctic security in response to the increasing Russia’s security threat, and promoting the rights of the indigenous in the EU’s Arctic region. The next sections of the paper will analyze, and discuss the EU’s primary policies in each of the 3 strategy realms, and present the prospects for each strategy realm.

Climate Change Impact Mitigation and the Response, and the Sustainable Use of Energy

Responding to the climate change impacts incurred from warming in the EU’s Arctic region, the European Commission and the EU’s Arctic states, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, are setting their arctic policies to the course that they are retrofitted to have resilience from climate change mitigation and environmental degradation. Corresponding to it, the Directorate General of Climate Action of the European Commission are mandating the member states of the EU to submit the NDC (Nationally Determined Contributions) to reach the goal of the Paris Agreement

(Durney, 2017; European Council of the European Union, 2023). According to the NDCs, the EU's Arctic states have met their 2020 targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions individually. Sweden and Denmark have reached their goal of abating the emissions of greenhouse gas over 28% and 15%, respectively (European Environment Agency, 2023). And these members of the EU are on a smooth track to meet the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by the year of 2030 that is set out in the EU's 2030 Climate and Energy Framework (Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020). Furthermore, the EU has joined the 'Climate and Clean Air Coalition', a voluntary partnership designed to complement the agreement of the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). It consists of governments, civil groups, scientific organizations, and intergovernmental bodies to arrange measures to reduce emissions of air pollutants such as black carbon, methane, Hydrofluorocarbons, tropospheric ozone to improve climate protection and air quality (Climate and Clean Air Coalition, 2024a).

It lays out and implements collective or independent measures in the network of its members to reduce emissions of air pollutants, and plays a role in creating, running, and managing funds for the measures. In 2017, the Arctic Council released a review that a considerable amount of emissions of methane from the 8 Arctic Council states including the EU's Arctic states, had been reduced by implementing joint projects with the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (Climate and Clean Air Coalition, 2024b).

The European Commission underscores the importance on implementation of the 'NERCD (National Emission Reduction Commitments Directive) that reflects the primary contents of 'CLRTAP (Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution) (European Environment Agency, 2024). The Convention was established on the basis of international cooperation to reduce SLCPs (Short-Lived Climate Pollutants) in the Arctic region (Emissions-EUETS.COM, 2024). As global warming in the Arctic region is accelerating due to the SLCPs, the Commission reiterates the significance of the reduction (European Commission, 2016).

The NERCD sets the target of cutting the emissions of SO₂ by 81%, NO_x by 69%, Non-methane Volatile Organic Compounds by 50%, NH₃ by 27%, PM_{2.5} (black carbon) by 51%, and methane by 33% by 2030 compared to the base year of 2005 (AirClim, 2021).

However, there has been a report that none of the EU's Arctic states is on track toward the 2030 goal in implementing the directive (AirClim, 2021).

Given that the NERCD covers the air pollutants that primarily are emitted from and in living area in the EU, it is not too difficult to present the prospect that the emissions of such SLCPs are expected to increase gradually as the residential area in the Arctic region can be forecast to be continuously developed and expanded owing to the amplification of warming in the region. From what has been discussed thus far, it is incontrovertibly clear that the emissions of greenhouse gases from the EU's Arctic states, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark are on the decline on the whole. On the contrary, the emissions of SLCPs from living areas of the Arctic region are not expected to decrease in the long run due to the expected expansion of living area in the region.

Reinforcing Security

As the Russian invasion to Ukraine has altered security status in the Arctic, regional cooperation between Russia and the other Arctic member states has come to pause. As one of the ramifications, in 2022, 3 March, the Arctic Council has refused to meet under Russia's chairmanship (Buckley, 2023, p. 135), and decided to suspend every work by the Council temporarily as a response to the Russian invasion to Ukraine (Arctic Today, 2021).

Also, another consequence of the war would be expansion of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty

Organization) with Sweden and Finland acceding to it. Finland became a full member of NATO, 4 April in 2023, and so did Sweden about a year later in 2024 (NATO, 2024). The accessions to NATO by the two countries, member states of the Arctic Council, have resulted in further isolation of Russia in the decision making process of the Arctic Council. In particular, the accession of Finland that has border with Russia is expected to ratchet up tensions with Russia overtime as the accessions would allow NATO to secure enhanced military capability to be more braced up for possible military conflicts with Russia in the end (Winkel, 2023, p. 3).

Finland and Sweden that have their territories in part in the Arctic have been continuously doing military exercise in the Arctic as members of NORDEFKO (Nordic Defense Cooperation) aware of Russia's security threat to the region. And Sweden has been chair of the international body since 2023. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Norway are members of the organization as well. It was established in 2009 to reinforce the members' defense capabilities and improve possibilities of taking collective measures in case that the defense relevant crisis arises in the neighboring area (Government Offices of Sweden, 2024).

The discussions above can deliver a perspective that the NORDEFKO members' accession to NATO can bolster the NATO's existing military power. Moreover, with the two members of the EU joining NATO, the EU can anticipate not only the role of Nordic Defense Cooperation but also the NATO's more systematic military support for security in the EU's Arctic region. It should be instrumental to the EU's augmentation of security for the Arctic region, and to the EU's strategies and, furthermore, to the implementation for that purpose. Also, as Russia is most likely to continuously focus more on its aggression against Ukraine, it would divert its attention from the Arctic, and can reduce its deployments of military forces to be stationed in the Arctic as a result. In addition, Russia would find it difficult to reinforce its existing military forces that has already been deployed in the Arctic due to the economic sanctions by the West (Winkel, 2023, p. 4).

From that perspective, one can argue that the security threat by Russia in the Arctic should be lessened for the EU. And Russia has modified its national strategy for the Arctic following its war against Ukraine. The Russian government has deleted the contents relevant to the Arctic Council in the newly amended strategy, and underlined the pursuit of its interest of the Arctic via its efforts to be independent of the Arctic industry projects that it does. Whilst its first strategy, released in 2020, calls for strengthening relationships with the Arctic states, the newly amended strategy underscores the development of relationships with foreign states on bilateral level (High North News, 2023).

It is an indication to suggest that it reiterates the relationships with other foreign states involved in certain issues for national interest rather than ones with the Arctic states that Russia has maintained and strengthened to date. This perspective can become a key element that security threat posed by Russia in the Arctic can be lessened as Russia is most likely to reduce its interest in the Arctic. After all, the entry of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the declined deployments of military resources due to the Russia's reduced interest in the Arctic because of its ongoing war against Ukraine, and the shift of its Arctic strategy from strengthening the relationships with the Arctic states to bolstering the ones with foreign states on the basis of the involved issues, should be critical elements supporting for a substantiated prospect that the security crisis in the EU's Arctic region is expected to be diminished for now.

Wellbeing of the Indigenous

As aforementioned, the wellbeing of the indigenous in the Arctic is one of the 3 common primary strategy realms of the Arctic strategy by the EU Arctic states.

It is undeniable that it is remarkably critical to secure the rights of the indigenous and to have a well-established system of legislation and institution that supports for security of the rights so as to ensure wellbeing of the indigenous. The indigenous within the EU's Arctic region are protected by the European Community Law. This law ensures the offered information and the free and full participation of the indigenous in development of the Arctic region. The EU's regional policy and border programs are conferring benefits on institutions for the indigenous that take part in the EU's Northern Dimension policy (European Commission, 2008). The Arctic Stakeholders' Forum and regular dialogues with the indigenous, referred to as the Arctic Dialogues, are now pivotal part of the EU's Arctic strategy (European Commission, 2021b).

The continuous efforts by the indigenous in effectively protecting whales within the frame of the International Whaling Community, and protecting the indigenous who make a living by hunting seals, are so meaningful to the indigenous that the associated international agreements have gone into effect. And they can be considered as a measure to maintain lifestyle of the indigenous in that perspective. Before everything else, the Arctic member states of the EU have adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and transposed the contents concerned with the rights of indigenous peoples and tribes into national laws and put them in place (UN, 2013).

As the Swedish government has adopted the declaration, it is strengthening the dialogues with the Sámi representing its northern region. Revamping the constitution in 2011, the government recognized the Sámi by including obligations into the constitution such as developing local communities of the indigenous, and the culture, and promoting the maintenance. Also, the Sámi Parliament that was established back in 1993 is playing a crucial role in exercising the right to self-determination (Government Offices of Sweden, 2021). The Sámi Parliament consisting of representatives of the Sámi and national government agency is obligated to monitor and plan the considerations in regard to solutions for pending issues (Government Offices of Sweden, 2021).

The Finnish government provides its Sámi with more systematic supports. First of all, the Ministry of Justice advocates for developing Sami cultural autonomy, and dealing with Sámi rights across the ministries (Ministry of Justice Finland, 2021).

It can imply that the holistic approach pursues supporting and protecting not only Sámi culture but also Sámi rights for life in general. The Finnish government advocates for Sámi rights in terms of protecting Sámi language. For example, the Sámi language Act was established for that purpose (Hammine, 2016, p. 6). The Act allows the use of Sámi language in courts and public institutions. And it deals with public institutions' obligations to promote and implement the Sámi rights relevant to use of Sámi language. Also, as the Act on the Sámi Parliament is enacted, the Sámi Parliament is run and it offers advices and guidance to the authorities regarding the negotiation obligation of legislative projects (Ministry of Justice Finland, 2021). Moreover, the Act on the Sámi Parliament ensures that legal status of the Finnish Sámi is recognized, and treated administratively and it stipulates that the rights of the Sámi to voting and justice should be assured for certain (Joon, 2024).

As discussed earlier, the Danish government set its strategy for the Arctic into 4 different realms, A Peaceful, secure and safe arctic, Self-sustaining growth and development, Development with respect for the Arctic's vulnerable climate, and Close cooperation with international partners. It is undeniable fact that the strategy doesn't contain the realm of the country's indigenous people (Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, 2021). However, Denmark has passed the Act of Greenland Self-Government that enables the Greenland Self-Government to extend its internal and external rights with about 75% approval in referendum back in 2008 (Göcke, 2009, p. 103). The Act recognizes the Greenland residents' rights to self-determination (Göcke, 2009, p. 115). As of 2022, Greenlandic Inuit takes up the overwhelming 88.9% of the whole population

of the region (IWGIA, 2023). Thus, it can be construed up as meaning that the rights of the indigenous people stipulated in the Act of Greenland Self-Government means the recognition of the Greenlandic Inuit's rights to self-determination. But, the Danish Greenlandic indigenous is guaranteed only with the internal rights to self-determination both legally and practically (Göcke, 2009, p. 113). From the perspective, it can be seen that the Danish indigenous people whose internal rights to self-determination is assured, and is guaranteed also with creating their own political party and the relevant political activities. Furthermore, they have been braced with a legal basis and a political leap towards improving their well-being after all.

And, a sea of highly political discourses regarding the security status of Greenland have been produced. Recently, Multiple polls conducted on the Greenlanders show that approximately 85% of them do not want to be a part of the U.S. The U.S president, Donald Trump, after his re-election, showed his strong desire to acquire the Arctic island that has autonomy by a large degree from Denmark (The Guardian, 2025). However, the outcome can lead to an analysis that the Greenlanders will retain the autonomy and the U.S president's remarks of the Greenland will be most likely turned out to be merely political rhetoric not affecting especially political security on the Arctic island.

Conclusion

The EU presents 3 primary strategy realms by large in its strategy for the Arctic region in the communication that it released in 2021. They are climate change impact mitigation and the response, reinforcing security against Russia, and wellbeing of the indigenous peoples in the regions. The Arctic states of the EU, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, have established their strategies on their own for the Arctic region as well, reflecting the major policy courses of the EU.

This article analyzes and discusses the most recent EU's Arctic states' strategies towards the Arctic region, and draws 3 common realms of the strategies, and present the prospects in each of the 3 common strategy realms following further analyses and discussions relevant to the common strategy realms.

As discussed and encapsulated earlier, with regard to the First realm of the strategy, the realm of climate change impact mitigation and the response, it is highly likely that the current main policies of the Arctic states in the realm will stay on the track because they have proved to be as effective as they have. Thus, one can argue that the fact that the 3 Arctic states of the EU have achieved the 2020 goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and they have showed smooth progress in meeting their 2030 targets, can support for the prospect. And the emissions of SLCPs in biosphere is highly expected to increase due to expansion of residential area for increasingly melting of snow and ice in the Arctic region, it shows how critical it is for the states to put in place the relevant policies to cut down emissions of SLCPs in the end.

Concerning the security crisis posed by Russia in the Arctic, it can be foreseen that the crisis should be lessened because Russia is most likely to focus strategic resources on its continuous aggression against Ukraine and the EU could build up its military resources in the Arctic as Sweden and Finland have acceded to NATO.

And, the aforementioned analyses and discussions of the 3 Arctic states' strategies for well-being of the indigenous peoples on the whole in the Arctic region shows rather positive and developmental prospect for future. Because the two Arctic states of the EU, Sweden and Finland, have been running the Sámi Parliament and Denmark has increased possibility of establishing a political party for its Greenlandic indigenous people and it is highly likely that it ensures the

party's legitimate activity by the Greenlandic Inuit securing the rights to self-determination.

In that regard, one can argue that the realm of security is more overriding strategic area than the other two realms as it can create fundamental and stable political air that enables the two strategy realms to be established and allows the relevant policies to be implemented. Besides, the two strategy realms are believed not to have yet considerable impacts on the absolute majority of a state.

And, it can be noted that cooperation among policy actors in the Arctic region should be considered as overriding and pivotal (Arctic Council, 2025; The Arctic Institute, 2023b; Byers, 2017; Pezard et al., 2025; Stępień & Koivurova, 2017). Especially cooperation among the Arctic Council, International Agreements, Non-EU states in the Arctic, observers to the Arctic Council, and the EU or Non-EU organizations representing the indigenous in the Arctic, should be regarded as prerequisite that underlies effective implementation of the primary policies in the EU's Arctic states' 3 common strategy realms.

But, what makes the cooperation among the policy actors more feasible should be support of public finances from the EU. The EU has allocated a considerable amount of budget to implementing its Arctic strategy in terms of cooperation with the other policy actors in the Arctic region. The budget includes a number of cooperation programs, investments and funding for cooperation with Greenland. First, 273 Million euro has been allocated for, as mentioned early, the Interreg Northern Periphery and Arctic and Aurora for 2021-2027 to support cooperation for polices on climate change, sustainable development (European Union, 2024). As for the investments, the EU is expected to make good use of its Invest EU funding and to generate 372 Billion euro in public and private investments for 2021-2027 (German Arctic Office, 2022). And the sizable amount of funding is planned to be harnessed to support promotion of innovative technologies (German Arctic Office, 2022). And lastly, the EU is planning to support for the Greenland with investment of 225 Million euro between 2021 and 2027 for sustainable development and diversification of its economy. Executing this sizable budget by the EU is expected to be greatly instrumental to the European Arctic states in implementing their national policies in the common strategy realms that they have transposed from the EU Arctic strategy down the road.

Above all, last but not least, it should be argued that the aforementioned cooperation should be based upon coordinated policies through continuous issue relevant bilateral or multilateral talks. Furthermore, if it would be tough for the EU Arctic states to be engaged in given issues in the Arctic region with other policy actors for the solutions, then, it is invariably significant that the EU Arctic states endeavor to derive binding agreements concerned with the given issues, at least, among themselves if necessary, showing cohesiveness.

AI Acknowledgment

Generative AI or AI-assisted technologies were not used in any way to prepare, write, or complete essential authoring tasks in this manuscript.


Conflict of Interests

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research.

ORCID iD

Hyuk Jeong  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2234-1087>

References

- AirClim. (2021). *The directive on national emission ceilings*. <https://www.airclim.org/directive-national-emission-ceilings-nec>
- Arctic Council. (2011). *Nuuk declaration on the occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council 12 May 2011, Nuuk, Greenland*. <https://oaarchive.arcticcouncil.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/e7765ce9-f7da-49ab-b25d-d1fdea45b3f2/content>
- Arctic Council. (2024). *The Kingdom of Denmark*. <https://arcticcouncil.org/about/states/denmark/>
- Arctic Council. (2025). *International cooperation in the Arctic*. <https://arctic-council.org/explore/work-cooperation/>
- The Arctic Institute. (2019). *Sweden's arctic strategy: An overview*. <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/sweden-arctic-strategy-overview/>
- The Arctic Institute. (2021). *Sweden's new arctic strategy: Change and continuity in the face of rising global uncertainty*. <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/sweden-new-arctic-strategy-change-continuity-face-rising-global-uncertainty/>
- The Arctic Institute. (2023a). *Navigating uncertainties: Finland's evolving arctic policy and the role of a regionally adaptive EU arctic policy*. <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/navigating-uncertainties-finland-evolving-arctic-policy-role-regionally-adaptive-eu-arctic-policy/>
- The Arctic Institute. (2023b). *Can arctic cooperation be restored?* <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/can-arctic-cooperation-restored/>
- Arctic Research Consortium of the United States. (2009). <https://www.arcus.org/witness-the-arctic/2009/2/article/496>
- Arctic Today. (2024). *Suspending participation in the Arctic Council is tragic, but right*. <https://www.arctictoday.com/suspending-participation-in-the-arctic-council-is-tragic-but-right/>
- Bodlund, M. T. (2019). *The Sámi and the EU - Mapping Sami channels of influence to the European Union*. Mid Sweden European Office, Linköping University.
- Buckley, A. (2023). Commentary, destabilization of the Arctic, commentary. *Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies*, 7(2), 128–143.
- Byers, M. (2017). Crises and international cooperation among: An arctic case study. *International Relations*, 31(4), 375–402. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117817735680>
- Chuffart, R., Raspotnik, A., & Stepien, A. (2021). Our common arctic? A more sustainable EU-arctic nexus in light of the European green deal. *The Polar Journal*, 11(2), 284–302.
- ClassNK. (2021). *Ballast water management convention*. <https://www.classnk.or.jp/hp/ko/activities/statutory/ballastwater/index.html>
- Climate and Clean Air Coalition. (2024a). *The climate and clean air coalition*. <https://www.ccacoalition.org/content/climate-and-clean-air-coalition>
- Climate and Clean Air Coalition. (2024b). *Arctic countries commit to reduce black carbon emissions by as much as a third*. <https://www.ccacoalition.org/news/arctic-countries-commit-reduce-black-carbon-emissions-much-third>
- Commissione Europea. (2024). *President von der Leyen inaugurates the EU Office in Nuuk and signs cooperation agreements to strengthen the EU-Greenland Partnership*. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/ip_24_1425
- Dobson, N. (2018) Climate change and energy in the Arctic-The role of the European Union, *The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law*, 33(2018), 380–402.
- Durney, J. (2017). Defining the Paris Agreement. *Carbon and Climate Law Review*, 11(3), 234–242. <https://doi.org/10.21552/cclr/2017/3/16>
- Emissions-EUETS.COM. (2024). *NEC directive*. <https://emissions-euets.com/carbon-market-glossary/2312-nec-directive>
- European Commission. (2008). *Communication from the commission to the European Parliament and the*

- Council, the European Union and the arctic region COM/2008/0763/final.
- European Commission. (2016). *Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council, an integrated European Union policy for the Arctic*. Brussels, 27.4. JOIN (2016) 21 final.
- European Commission. (2021a). *Joint communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, a stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable, and prosperous arctic*, Brussels, 13. 10. 2021, Join (2021) 27 final.
- European Commission. (2021b). *Overview of EU actions in the Arctic and their impact*.
- European Commission. (2021c). *Europe's earth observation, satellite navigation and communications missions and services for the benefit of the Arctic*. JRC technical report.
- European Commission. (2022). *EU helps the Sámi getting their voice heard*. https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-helps-sami-getting-their-voice-heard-2022-07-26_en
- European Commission. (2024). *EU Arctic Forum and indigenous peoples' dialogue*. https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/events/eu-arctic-forum-and-indigenous-peoples-dialogue-2024-05-14_en
- European Council of the European Union. (2023). *Paris Agreement: Council submits updated NDC on behalf of EU and member states*. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/10/16/paris-agreement-council-submits-updated-ndc-on-behalf-of-eu-and-member-states/>
- European Environment Agency. (2023). *Progress towards national greenhouse gas emissions targets in Europe*. <https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/progress-towards-national-greenhouse-gas>
- European Environment Agency. (2024). *National emission reduction commitments directive*. <https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/topics/in-depth/air-pollution/need>
- European Polar Board. (2022). *EU Arctic Forum, indigenous people's dialogue and arctic youth dialogue-registration open*. <https://www.europeanpolarboard.org/news-events/news/article/news/eu-arctic-forum-indigenous-peoples-dialogue-and-arctic-youth-dialogue-registration-open/>
- European Union. (2024). *The EU in the Arctic*. https://eeas.eu.com/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EU%20in%20the%20Arctic%20Overview%20Factsheet_online%20version.pdf
- Finland's Strategy for Arctic Policy. (2021). *Working group of public servants responsible for arctic issues, steering group for the strategy for arctic policy*. The Finnish Government. https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/163247/VN_2021_55.pdf
- German Arctic Office. (2022). *EU engagement in the Arctic*. Fact Sheet. https://www.arctic-office.de/fileadmin/user_upload/www.arctic-office.de/PDF_uploads/Fact_Sheets/FactSheet_EU_englisch_neu.pdf
- Göcke, K. (2009). The 2008 referendum on Greenland's autonomy and what it means for Greenland's future. *Zeitschrift Für Ausländisches öffentliches Recht Und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV)*, 69(1), 103–121.
- Government Offices of Sweden. (2021, March 18). *Department for international law, human rights, and treaty law. Sweden's response to the expert mechanism on the rights of indigenous peoples*. Memorandum. <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/indigenouspeoples/cfi/submissionsselfdetermination/subm-self-determination-under-sta-sweden.pdf>
- Government Offices of Sweden. (2024). *Nordic defense cooperation*. <https://www.government.se/government-policy/nordic-defence-cooperation/>
- The Guardian. (2025). *New opinion poll shows 85% of Greenlanders do not want to join US*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/28/85-of-greenlanders-do-not-want-to-join-us-says-new-poll>
- Hammine, M. (2016). *Sami languages in education in Sweden and Finland*. ECMI Working paper #92. European Center for Minority Issues.
- Heininen, L. (2012). *Arctic strategies and policies: Inventory and comparative study*. The Northern Research Forum & University of Lapland. https://www.rha.is/static/files/NRF/Publications/arctic_strategies_7th_draft_new_20120428.pdf
- Heininen, L., Everett, K., Padrtova, B., & Reissel, A. (2020). *Arctic policies and strategies-analysis, synthesis, and trends*. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria.
- Helsinki Times. (2023). *Finland adopts decree on Sámi Climate Council to bring indigenous knowledge into climate policy processes*. <https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/23115-finland-adopts-decree-on-sami-climate-council-to-bring-indigenous-knowledge-into-climate-policy-processes>.

html

- High North News. (2023). *Russia amends arctic policy prioritizing 'national interest' and removing cooperation within Arctic Council*. <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-amends-arctic-policy-prioritizing-national-interest-and-removing-cooperation-within-arctic>
- IMO (International Maritime Organization). (2010). *The HNS convention*. <https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/HNS-2010.aspx>.
- IWGIA (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs). (2023). <https://www.iwgia.org/en/kalaallit-nunaat-greenland/5071-iw-2023-kalaallit-nunaat.html>
- Joonas, J. (2024). *Recent developments in regard to the legal status of Sámi in Finland*. <https://lauda.ulapland.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/63192/Joona.Juha.pdf>
- Jouhier, S. (2024). *The European Union's capacity to act in the Arctic: Charting degrees of EU actorness in the European and circumpolar territories*. EU Diplomacy Paper. Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe.
- Karlsson, Ida, Rootzén, Johan, Johnson, Filip. (2020). Reaching net zero carbon emissions in construction supply chains -Analysis of a Swedish road construction project. *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews*, 120(2020) 109651, 1-14.
- Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. (2011). <https://library.arcticportal.org/1890/1/DENMARK.pdf>
- Koivurova, T., Kokko, K., Duyck, S., Sellheim, N., & Stepien, A. (2012). The present and future of competence of the European Union in the Arctic. *Polar Record*, 48(4), 361–371. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247411000295>
- Kulovesi, K., & Oberthür, S. (2020). Assessing the EU's 2030 climate and energy policy framework: Incremental change toward radical transformation. *Review of European Comparative and International Environmental Law*, 29(2), 151–166. <https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12358>
- Lähteenmäki, M. (2017). *Footprints in the snow: The long history of Arctic Finland*. Prime Minister's Office Publications. <https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/80043>
- Larsen, P. B., & Gilbert, J. (2020). Indigenous rights and ILO Convention 169: Learning from the past and challenging the future. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 24(23), 83–93. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2019.1677615>
- Lebel, J., & Nilsson, A. E. (2024). EU engagement in the Arctic: Challenges to achieving ambitions in an area outside its jurisdiction. *Arctic Review on Law and Politics*, 15, 47–71.
- Marchenkov, M. L. (2022). Consistency and adaptability: New aspects of the Arctic policy of Sweden. *Arctic and North*, 47, 126–141. <https://doi.org/10.37482/issn2221-2698.2022.47.126>
- Ministry of Justice Finland. (2021). *Rights of the Sámi people*. <https://oikeusministerio.fi/en/rights-of-the-sami-people>
- Muhammad, M. (2012). Evaluating arctic dialogue: A case study of stakeholder relations for sustainable oil and gas development. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 5(3), 34–45. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v5n3p34>
- NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). (2024). *Relations with Finland*. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49594.htm
- Pedersen, T. (2019). Polar research and the secrets of the Arctic. *Arctic Review on Law and Politics*, 10(2019), 103–129.
- Pezard, S., Tingstad, A., & Hall, A. (2025). *The future of arctic cooperation in a changing strategic environment, perspective, rand Europe*. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep19915.pdf>
- Polar Journal. (2024). *The European Union sets up in Nuuk, 2024*. <https://polarjournal.ch/en/2024/03/14/the-european-union-sets-up-in-nuuk/>
- Rahbek-Clemmensen, J. (2016). An arctic great power? Recent developments in Danish arctic policy. *Arctic Yearbook*, 5, 345–359. https://findresearcher.sdu.dk/ws/portalfiles/portal/129580208/An_Arctic_Great_Power_Recent_Developments_in_Danish_Arctic_Policy.pdf
- Raspotnik, A., & Stepien, A. (2020). The European Union and the Arctic: A decade into finding its arcticness. In J. Weber (Ed.), *Handbooks on geopolitics and security in the Arctic*. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45005-2_8

- Rovaniemi Arctic Spirit. (2023). *Rovaniemi Arctic Spirit 2023: Collaborative science in the Sami Climate Council to address climate change*. <https://www.rovaniemiarticspirit.fi/news/Report-from-Rovaniemi-Arctic-Spirit-2023-Collaborative-Science-in-the-S%C3%A1mi-Climate-Council-to-address-Climate-Change/42450/1f63c636-78cd-4714-be82-90f4939aa1e7>
- The Royal Circle: Swedish Monarchy and the Arctic. (2020). <https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2020/2020-briefing-notes/368-the-royal-circle-swedish-monarchy-and-the-arctic>
- SÁMIRÁÐÐI. (2024). *EU-unit*. <https://www.saamicouncil.net/en/euu#:~:text=The%20collaboration%20between%20the%20Saami%20Council%20and,for%20sustainable%20and%20inclusive%20development%20in%20S%C3%A1pmi>
- Sandberg, E., & Krook-Riekkola, A. (2022). The impact of technology availability on the transition to net-zero industry in Sweden. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 363(2022), 132594.
- Seyaz, A. (2024). Change and continuity in North European security: Finland and Sweden's membership in NATO. *Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi: Marmara University Journal of Political Science*, 12(1), 129–141. <https://doi.org/10.14782/marmarasbd.1431218>
- Shubin, S., & Rogachev, I. (2017). The Forth International Arctic Forum, 'The Arctic-A territory of dialogue'. *The Polar Journal*, 7(2), 425–426.
- Stępień, A., & Koivurova, T. (2017, February). *Arctic Europe, bringing together the EU arctic policy and nordic cooperation, government's analysis, assessment and research activities*. Prime Minister's Office, Finland. <https://lauda.ulapland.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/62766/Koivurova.Timo.pdf?sequence=2>
- Stępień, A., & Raspotnik, A. (2021). *Continuity with great confidence: The European Union's 2021 arctic policy update*, The Arctic Institute. <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Continuity-with-Greater-Confidence-The-EUs-Arctic-Policy-Update-2021.pdf>
- Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region. (2011). *Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Government Offices of Sweden*.
- Sweden's Strategy for the Arctic Region. (2020). *Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Government Offices of Sweden*.
- Swedish Polar Research Secretariat. (2020). *Polar research a priority area in the Swedish Government's Arctic Strategy*. <https://www.polar.se/en/news/2020/polar-research-a-priority-area-in-the-swedish-government-s-arctic-strategy/>
- United Nations. (2013). *The United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples*.
- Väätänen, V. (2021). Securing anticipatory geographies: Finland's Arctic strategy and the geopolitics of international competitiveness. *Geopolitics*, 26(2), 615–638.
- Winkel, J. (2023). The impact of the Ukraine war on the Arctic. *FOKUS 5/2023, AUSTRIA INSTITUT FÜR EUROPA-UND SICHERHEITSPOLITIK*.
- WWF. (2024). *Arctic youth recommendations at EU Arctic Forum and indigenous people's dialogue*. <https://www.arcticwwf.org/newsroom/news/arctic-youth-recommendations-at-eu-arctic-forum-and-indigenous-peoples-dialogue/>
- Yle. (2024). *Finland proposes Arctic Council Summit*. <https://yle.fi/a/3-5582271>