

Article

Indonesia Should Recognise Israel? The Jokowi's Last Dance to Host the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup

Ali Maksum*

Department of International Relations, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Sitti Zarina Alimuddin

International Relations Postgraduate Studies, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Ahmad Sahide

International Relations Postgraduate Studies, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Muchammad Farid

Department of International Relations, Universitas Pendidikan Muhammadiyah Sorong, Indonesia

Abstract

While Indonesia's bid to host the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup ultimately fell through, it is crucial to scrutinise President Jokowi's final attempts to persuade the Indonesian public. Jokowi's stance on Israel's involvement in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup has sparked speculation about Indonesia's position on the Israel-Palestine conflict. Through an examination of President Jokowi's discourse, this research seeks to uncover the underlying political narratives, diplomatic strategies, and symbolic expressions that shape Indonesia's response to this issue. Using discourse analysis, this article posits that President Jokowi utilises diverse linguistic and rhetorical devices to construct his response, navigating the delicate equilibrium between securing global recognition through hosting the event and reiterating Indonesia's firm support for Palestinian independence. This study found that Jokowi's political symbolism is ineffective in gaining international and domestic support. This research contributes to the broader discourse on sports politicization especially on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Keywords

Indonesia, Jokowi, Palestine, Israel, FIFA U-20 World Cup

Corresponding author:

* Email: ali.maksum@fisipol.umy.ac.id

Introduction

The mention of “Israel” in the Indonesian public discourse is highly contentious. The sensitivity and aversion towards Jewish symbols and identity in Indonesia have contributed to the exclusion of Judaism from the official religion in the country. However, it is a well-established fact that Jewish communities coexist and maintain harmonious relationships with native groups in various regions of Indonesia (Muhtadi, 2007). The repudiation of Israel as a sovereign country aligns with the anti-colonial principles articulated in the preamble of the Indonesian constitution in 1945. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that for the Muslim population in Indonesia, the Israeli occupation of Palestine is perceived as an act of sacrilege against the Al Aqsa Mosque, a significant symbol of the Islamic faith, and the rich historical legacy of Islam associated with it (Alkaff, 2021). The prevailing narrative in the Indonesian public regarding the sorrow and suffering endured by the victims has contributed to a growing hostile sentiment against Israel. The assertion that Israel’s actions towards the Palestinian population are characterised by brutality is deemed to be an act that is widely regarded as unacceptable (Syari’ah et al., 2022). According to Prawira et al. (2021), the majority of Indonesian individuals hold the belief that Palestinian independence is an indisputable matter.

Even while at the grassroots level, Israel is considered a savage and inhumane country, at the upper level it seems that the Israeli state is perceived differently (Muttaqien, 2013). Throughout history, there have been multiple attempts to establish diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Israel. From the tenure of President Sukarno to President Abdurrahman Wahid, a series of significant occurrences came to light, indicating the existence of deliberations between the respective parties aimed at exploring diplomatic relations. One notable event during the early 1990s was the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to Jakarta, as documented by Barton and Rubenstein (2005). In addition to this, the travels made by Indonesian figures and communities to Israel have sparked internal criticism due to their controversial nature. For instance, in 2016, a delegation of Indonesian journalists conducted an official visit (Wardah, 2016). Additionally, in 2018, Yahya Cholil Staqif, the chairman of Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), which is Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation, also undertook a visit (Kahfi, 2018). Indeed, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu extended a formal reception and warm welcome to all Indonesian guests. Lastly, former Indonesian vice president Jusuf Kalla proposed the initiative, believing that it may offer Indonesia a stronger role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. However, the prospect of establishing diplomatic relations with Israel is seen as inconceivable, particularly due to the anticipated vehement opposition, particularly from the Indonesian Muslim community (Purba, 2022; Strangio, 2021).

However, it is evident that Indonesia’s foreign policy principle, as established by its inaugural vice president, Mohammad Hatta, was characterised by a commitment to being “free and active” without aligning with any specific international political body (Hatta, 1953). Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Israel’s occupation of Palestine is rooted in its unwavering commitment to the self-determination of Palestine and the pursuit of a two-state solution with Israel. In fact, none of the Indonesian presidents have made any efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Despite initial expectations, President Abdurrahman Wahid did not follow through on his intention to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, as observed in both policy and practise (Barton & Rubenstein, 2005; Muttaqien, 2013). Throughout history, the appearance of Israeli symbols in Indonesia, particularly through Israeli politicians and athletes, has consistently led to demonstrations and challenges in acquiring visas (Kumparan, 2023).

Meanwhile, Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the global governing body for football, has a long and complex relationship with Israel. Despite facing regional and

political challenges, Israel has been a member of FIFA since 1929, predating its establishment as a state in 1948. Over the decades, Israel's participation in FIFA competitions has fraught with geopolitical tensions. Initially, Israel was part of the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), but due to political opposition from its neighbouring countries, it was expelled in 1974 and subsequently joined the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) in 1994 (Hareuveny & Blanga, 2023). This move allowed Israel to continue competing in international tournaments, albeit in a different regional context. FIFA's commitment to maintaining a global and inclusive approach to football often puts it at the centre of political controversies. Despite calls from various groups to boycott Israel or exclude it from competitions, FIFA has maintained Israel's rights to participate, emphasizing its mission to keep sports and politics separate (Broda, 2022). Likewise, in the context of the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup, FIFA's insistence on including Israel aligns with its historical position of supporting all members nations' participation in international events.

The boycott of Israeli athletes' participation in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup is not the first time this has happened to the Israeli contingent. Israeli athletes have been boycotted multiple times at international tournaments, causing controversy in the local society. For example, during the 1962 Asian Games, Indonesia, under the leadership of Sukarno, demonstrated courage by refusing to allow the participation of Israel and Taiwan for political reasons. Israel's exclusion was a gesture of respect towards Muslim nations in the Middle East and the Islamic community in Indonesia. Additionally, Taiwan was denied participation due to Indonesia's commitment to maintaining friendly relations with the People's Republic of China (Hübner, 2012). Meanwhile, the 1974 Munich Olympic Games sparked the "Munich Massacre," which resulted in brutal conflicts between Palestinian civilians and Israeli sportsmen (Dubinsky, 2021). Apart from that, Israel's participation in the 1974 Asian Games in Tehran, Iran, caused a reaction from the Iranian public, despite the close connections between the Reza Pahlavi dynasty and Israel and the beginning of the wave of the Iranian revolution (Hareuveny & Blanga, 2023). At the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro and the 2012 Summer Olympic Games in London, Lebanese athletes refused to participate against Israeli athletes and refused to share a bus with them (Reiche, 2018). Not only are athletes involved, but many activists use sporting events to oppose Israeli injustices and support Palestine (Dart, 2017).

Curiously, in the context of the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup, President Jokowi, representing the administration, refrained from expressing any concerns with Israel's participation in his official statement. President Suharto, a highly authoritative and influential leader, avoided publicly acknowledging the existence of Israel, despite evidence suggesting covert procurement of aircraft from Israel (Barton & Rubenstein, 2005). Thus, the research question is: why does Jokowi attempt to persuade the people about the importance of hosting the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup by welcoming the Israeli delegation while maintaining his backing of Palestine? Therefore, this work is significant for several reasons: 1) For the first time in history, the Indonesian government has not questioned the presence of official Israeli symbols and delegations in Indonesia; 2) Given that Indonesia is hosting the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup, two blocks have emerged, namely pro-Israel and in opposition to the participation of the Israeli delegation 3) Researchers have not paid substantial attention to the topic of investigating the story of Jokowi's speech regarding the presence of the Israeli delegation.

This article argues that President Jokowi used various linguistic and rhetorical devices to construct his discourse on Indonesia's response to the Israeli participation in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup. Specifically, following the public protest (Regan & Jamaluddin, 2023), he tried to balance his commitment to FIFA regulations and his solidarity with Palestine. On the one hand, he intended to secure Indonesia's global recognition by hosting the event. On the other hand, he also endeavoured to emphasise Indonesia's enduring commitment to supporting

the cause of Palestinian independence. This phenomenon has an obvious correlation with the endeavours of Jokowi, to enhance the international standing of the country while simultaneously prioritising domestic concerns, as well as ensuring his legitimacy and safeguarding the interests of his constituency. It is imperative to thoroughly deconstruct the significance of international recognition and political symbolism. However, before further investigation on those concepts, we try to offer a foreign policy style of Jokowi in order to understand his policy visions.

The Jokowi's Style of Foreign Policy

Jokowi, for instance, is widely regarded as a multifaceted political personality who exhibits populist tendencies and demonstrates a highly pragmatic approach to formulating policies, including those pertaining to foreign affairs (Bland, 2020). The pragmatism of Jokowi is demonstrated by his ability to maintain a balanced identity in the face of competition between the United States and China (Rosyidin, 2023). Jokowi's pragmatic approach is seen in his persistent pursuit of collaboration with China for infrastructure projects (Yan, 2023), but with less emphasis on risk management (Hudalah et al., 2022). The decisions made are not predicated upon threat and opportunity estimations, as posited by the neoclassical realism paradigm. Instead, according to Arif (2021), the direction of all foreign policy is determined by Jokowi's personal influence, pragmatism, and leadership style. Nevertheless, Jokowi's policy choices are often perceived as consistently prioritising domestic populism, despite the fact that such populism does not exert any discernible impact on foreign policy (Wicaksana, 2022).

The Jokowi's foreign policy relevance with Robert Putnam's two-level game theory which is defined as a political model that explains how domestic and international factors interact in shaping the outcomes of negotiations between states (Putnam, 1988). According to this theory, the chief negotiator of a state has to balance the interests and pressures of both the domestic actors (level 2) and the foreign counterparts (level 1) in order to reach an agreement that is acceptable and ratifiable by both sides (Méndez, 2017). The range of possible agreements that can satisfy the domestic constituencies is called the win-set. The size and shape of the win-set depend on various factors, such as the preferences, power, and coalitions of the domestic actors, the institutional rules and procedures for ratification, and the public opinion and expectations (Dollosa, 2022). However, in the digital era, this strategy has been disrupted by the emergence of social media, which can have a variety of external and internal effects (Bjola & Manor, 2018).

Jokowi's pragmatic foreign policy making process can be understood as an application of the two-level game theory. Jokowi, as the chief negotiator of Indonesia, has to consider the interests and demands of various domestic actors, such as his political party, the parliament, the military, the bureaucracy, the civil society, and the public, while also engaging with the international community and managing the relations with the major powers, especially China and the United States (Arif, 2022). Jokowi's foreign policy priorities, such as promoting Indonesia's identity as an archipelagic state, enhancing the role of middle power diplomacy, expanding the engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, and reforming the foreign ministry to emphasize economic diplomacy, reflect his attempt to balance the domestic and international dimensions of his decision-making (He, 2021; Laksmana, 2017).

The significance of the two-level game theory on Jokowi's foreign policy making process is that it helps to explain the challenges and opportunities that he faces in pursuing his goals. On the one hand, the two-level game theory suggests that Jokowi has to deal with the constraints and trade-offs imposed by the domestic and international factors, such as the nationalist sentiments, the regional leadership, the great power rivalry, and the pandemic crisis (Arif, 2022). On the other

hand, the two-level game theory also implies that Jokowi can use the leverage and flexibility that he has in both levels to advance his interests and influence the outcomes of the negotiations. For example, Jokowi can use his domestic popularity and legitimacy to gain support from the domestic actors for his foreign policy initiatives, or he can use his international reputation and network to shape the regional and global agenda and norms (Arif, 2022; Wardhani & Dugis, 2023).

Global Recognition

Recognition is a substantial concept across various fields like social philosophy, psychology, sociology, and international law, especially in the formal recognition of states. Political struggles for recognition have gained attention from empirical political science and peace and conflict studies. In recent years, international relations scholars have shown an increasing interest in recognition issues beyond a purely legal perspective. In the realm of international politics, recognition involves legal, political, and social practices among states or groups of states. Recognizing a political entity as a state bestows rights and privileges in the global community, essentially making a state's sovereignty practical and meaningful (Daase et al., 2015; Pfeifer et al., 2022).

International recognition is most evident when an established government formally acknowledges that another political entity has achieved the status of a sovereign state. For the entity receiving this international recognition, few things in politics are more significant. This recognition suddenly places the government officials and the people they represent on an equal footing with the major players in global politics (Agné et al., 2013). International recognition has a substantial impact on the political, security, legal, economic, and socio-cultural growth of nations. It provides states with legal protection, access to international organizations, and the opportunity to establish diplomatic and trade relationships with other countries (Fabry, 2010).

Although there is no a precise definition of state recognition, it broadly refers to the practice where established countries acknowledge new nations as independent entities (Visoka, 2021). This acknowledgment is seen as a crucial aspect of gaining statehood and a significant step toward joining the international community of sovereign states. While international recognition does not guarantee a nation's success, the lack of recognition can bring about numerous challenges when navigating the complex international landscape (Newman & Visoka, 2023; Roll, 2015).

Over the recent years, numerous publications have emerged that delve into the explanation of key international practices and institutions. They elucidate these concepts by referring to various mechanisms of acknowledgment. For instance, Fabry (2010) details how new states gain entry into the international community by virtue of being acknowledged by other states (Fabry, 2010). In contrast, Reus-Smit (2001) contends that the pursuit of recognition for individual rights has significantly contributed to the evolution and expansion of the international system (Reus-Smit, 2001). Conversely, Honneth (2014) and Wolf (2011) assert that achieving mutual recognition among states is imperative for steering international relations toward a more peaceful trajectory (Honneth, 2014; Wolf, 2011). Indeed, global recognition is imperative for developing countries like Indonesia because it can help them achieve their economic, social, and political goals. Global recognition can enhance a country's reputation, influence, and attractiveness in the international arena, and enable it to access more resources, opportunities, and partnerships. Global recognition can also empower a country to voice its interests and values, and to participate in shaping the global agenda and norms.

The attainment of worldwide reputation holds significant importance for Jokowi, as it serves as a means to acquire economic advantages, hence leading to the emergence of the concept known

as the “Jokowi doctrine.” Jokowi views international order pragmatically and economically. Jokowi highlights the goal of international order as pursuing equitable economic development for small and intermediate powers. Sovereignty and territorial integrity, sovereign equality, and reinvigorated multilateralism that delivers public goods in a just manner should underpin international order. Furthermore, Widodo believes that the international order should be open to the new developing economic powers that will progressively play a role in the twenty-first century (Umar, 2023).

Political Symbolism

Symbols arise from the fundamental human need to bring order to the chaotic realm of experiences, and to give that order significance. This structure is influenced by society and is a human creation. Symbols are the tangible results of this quest for meaning, carrying with them values and emotions. These symbols become ingrained in our everyday lives to the point where we hardly notice their effects. Nevertheless, these social constructs are constantly under the influence of ever-changing experiences (Rothman, 1981).

In the realm of politics, particularly concerning power dynamics, symbols play a significant role. The government’s actions significantly impact the lives of citizens, from taxation to war declarations and monetary policies that affect inflation or recession. In some cases, the consequences of government actions are clear, although interpretations may vary (Terfa et al., 2014). In other instances, the government subtly shapes perceptions, and the effects of its actions may only be faintly perceived. In both scenarios, symbols serve as vehicles for communication and tools for strengthening group unity. However, when individuals recognize these symbols as such, their use can be seen as a form of manipulation and may potentially erode group cohesion (Dittmer, 1977).

Symbols hold a central position in the structure of human society. While they may be most conspicuous in certain formal domains, such as institutionalized religion or the symbols of statehood like flags, anthems, and coats of arms, they are, in fact, present in every aspect of human life. This is because symbols serve a fundamental purpose in simplifying and making intricate phenomena more understandable. Political symbolism, within the realm of politics and governance, emerges as a potent and omnipresent instrument. It plays a pivotal role in conveying intricate concepts and sentiments, influencing public perception, and galvanizing support. Nonetheless, symbols, in their role of shaping comprehension, lack a single, universally accepted interpretation within a community (Gill & Angosto-Ferrandez, 2018).

A political symbol encompasses a wide range of items, individuals, expressions, or actions that stand for a political establishment, structure, group, conviction, or doctrine. This category includes flags, monarchs, and sovereigns, as well as melodies, verse, and national figures, among numerous other conceivable instances. Certain political symbols are intentionally designed for their role, while others are pre-existing elements or customs that have gained symbolic meaning. In essence, any object can function as a political symbol provided that individuals connect it to some facet of political actuality (Theiler, 2017).

Consistency and adaptability stand out as key qualities of inclusive political symbols. The foundational elements of political encounters are interwoven with paradoxes. The broad concepts like freedom, equality, sovereignty, class, and influence frequently require harmonization with the tangible occurrences of communal life. Symbols hold the capability to reshape occurrences of aggression and valour, unintended events, and misfortune into significant benchmarks of significance for both individuals and communities (Rothman, 1981).

Political symbolism constitutes a vibrant and complex element of the political arena, intricately linked with aspects like communication, identity, influence, and even strategic manoeuvring. Its historical importance is indisputable, and its profound influence on the present political landscape is undeniable. Grasping the profound meaning and complexities of political symbolism is imperative for individuals, decision-makers, and the academic community, as it persists in molding our political environment through a multitude of avenues (Boussaguet & Faucher, 2020; Faucher & Boussaguet, 2018; Permoser, 2012).

Jokowi along with his populist style, frequently employs symbolic foreign political instruments to exert influence and appeal to his followers. For instance, Jokowi consistently exhibits a modest demeanour by donning attire associated with lower socioeconomic backgrounds (Nazaruddin et al., 2023). On certain occasions, Jokowi strategically presents himself in a fashionable manner in order to make an impact on the young demographic voters (Suseno & Utami, 2022). Jokowi's journey to Afghanistan holds historical significance as it serves to symbolise the embodiment of moderate Muslims in the face of the increasing presence of hardline Islamic factions within the nation (Zaman, 2020). The video recording capturing Jokowi's visit gained significant online attention, becoming widely shared and discussed, coinciding with his status as a presidential candidate for the upcoming 2019 presidential election (Anya, 2018). Notably, the political symbolism of Jokowi, as manifested in his acts and speeches, consistently generates discussions regarding the merits and drawbacks of his policies. This is exemplified by the discourse surrounding China's impact on Indonesia (Herlijanto, 2022; Maksum & Sahide, 2019). Hence, it is intriguing to ascertain the underlying factors influencing Jokowi's reaction towards Israel's involvement in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup.

Methodology

The aim of this study is to analyse how President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) constructed his discourse on Indonesia's response to the Israeli participation in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup, which was initially scheduled to be hosted by Indonesia. The study adopts a qualitative approach, using discourse analysis as the main method of data collection and interpretation. Discourse analysis is a suitable method for examining the linguistic features, rhetorical strategies, and ideological implications of Jokowi's speech, as well as the socio-political context in which it was delivered (Fairclough, 2003; van Dijk, 2005, 2006). The data for this study consists of the transcript and video of Jokowi's press statement on March 28, 2023, which was published on the official website of the Presidential Secretariat. The statement was made after FIFA decided to remove Indonesia as the host of the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup, following the widespread rejection of the Israeli team's visit to Indonesia by various parties, including the governor of Bali (Duerden, 2023). The statement was also Jokowi's first public comment on the issue, after he had met with the Palestinian ambassador to Indonesia on March 24 (Afifa, 2023). The analysis of the data focuses on the following aspects: (1) the structure and organization of Jokowi's speech; (2) the use of linguistic devices, such as pronouns, modals, and metaphors, to convey his stance and attitude; (3) the employment of rhetorical techniques, such as repetition, contrast, and appeal to authority, to persuade and justify his position; and (4) the representation and evaluation of the main actors and events involved in the controversy, namely Indonesia, Israel, Palestine, FIFA, and the U20 World Cup. The analysis also considers the historical and cultural background of Indonesia's relations with Israel and Palestine, as well as the potential implications and consequences of Jokowi's discourse for Indonesia's domestic and international affairs. To provide a more comprehensive picture, we expanded our analysis to include public reactions collected

from social media platforms, media coverage from major news outlets, and statements from other key political figures. This integrative approach allowed us to correlate the sentiment across various sources surrounding this matter.

In contrast to the utilisation of quantitative data sampling techniques, the discourse analysis approach places greater emphasis on employing smaller samples in order to attain a more profound understanding of the conversation (Waikar, 2018). Hence, the present study aims to investigate President Jokowi's statement pertaining to the contentious issue of Israel's involvement in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup hosted by Indonesia. The public can access data pertaining to the English transcription of President Jokowi's statement through the Official Website of the Cabinet Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia (Office of Assistant to Deputy Cabinet Secretary for State Documents & Translation, 2023). Jokowi's English speech transcript has 321 words. Concurrently, the researcher transcribed Jokowi's address, which was delivered in Indonesian and lasted 4.6 minutes. The speech contains a total of 299 words that can be publicly accessed on the Presidential Secretariat Official YouTube (Sekretariat Presiden, 2023). However, the author focuses on English transcription for a larger readership (Please see Appendix).

This research utilised NVivo 12 Plus to analyse the Jokowi's speech. NVivo 12 Plus is a qualitative data analysis software designed to help researchers manage, organise, and analyse unstructured data, such as text, video, and social media content. Developed by QSR International (Burlington, Massachusetts), NVivo provides tools for coding, querying, and visualising data that allow researcher enable to uncover patterns, themes, and insights from complex datasets. Researchers can import various data formats, including transcripts, documents, PDFs, audio, and video files. Users can manually code data by selecting and categorising text segments or use auto-coding features for initial data segmentation based on specific criteria. NVivo offer powerful query tools that allow for detailed exploration of the data. These include text search queries, word frequency queries, and matrix coding queries. Text search queries enable the identification of occurrences of specific words or phrases within the data. Word frequency queries analyse the most frequently occurring words and can highlight significant themes and trends. Matrix coding queries for the examination of relationships between different codes and themes, providing valuable insights into the interactions among different aspects of the data. NVivo includes sentiment analysis tools that evaluate the emotional tone of text data. This feature uses a predefined lexicon to classify text as positive, negative, or neutral based on the presence of sentiment-laden words. Finally, NVivo provides various visualisation tools to help researchers understand and present the findings. These include charts, graphs, and models that depict the relationships between different codes and themes (Alam, 2021; Allsop et al., 2022; Dalkin et al., 2021).

Once the transcription process has been completed, the author conducts a thorough review and comparison of both the manual transcript and the publicly released transcript. The final transcript results are further analysed using the NVivo 12 Plus software to generate various data, such as sentiment analysis, word dominance, tree-map, and text search queries. The data processing procedure can be depicted in the following diagram.

Analysis and Findings

Jokowi's Ppeech Analysis Using NVivo 12 Plus

This section examines the author's analysis of Jokowi's speech using NVivo 12 Plus. Specifically, this section presents four analyses of the speech using NVivo features namely sentiment analysis, word dominance, word-tree, and tree map analysis. Firstly, in the sentiment analysis revealed a




Figure 1. Jokowi's speech analysis procedure uses NVivo 12 Plus




Figure 2. Sentiment analysis of Jokowi speech on Israel's participation in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup

nanced portrayal within President Jokowi's speech addressing the participation of the Israeli National Football Team in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup. The analysis indicates a complex mix of sentiments, with 72% of the content being identified as positive and 40% as negative. This suggests that the speech encompasses a range of emotions and perspectives, possibly reflecting the intricacies of Indonesia's response to the controversial issue. The positive sentiment is associated with aspects of diplomacy, global sportsmanship, or any potential benefits seen in international engagement. On the other hand, the negative sentiment could be tied to political considerations, historical grievances, or concerns regarding the participation of the Israeli team. Further in-depth analysis is warranted to unpack the specific themes and contexts contributing to these sentiments within the speech.




Figure 4. Word tree analysis of Jokowi's speech

Indonesia's interests. The visual representation further reveals President Jokowi's concerted efforts to convey the significance of Indonesia hosting the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup while concurrently maintaining support for Palestinian independence. Notably, it becomes evident that President Jokowi endeavours to persuade the public to distinguish between sports and politics in the context of these issues.




Figure 5. Tree-map flow of frequently used terms

Using NVivo software, the data visualisations above depict Jokowi’s word choices aimed at persuading the public regarding the planned arrival of the Israeli national football team. The sentiment analysis, which predominantly reflects positively, suggests that Jokowi’s communications strategy is resonating with and being accepted by the public. Word such as “consistent” and “host,” along with their association with other sentence structures and hierarchical organisation of sentences, indicate Jokowi’s strategy to reinforce his position on Palestinian independence, while simultaneously aiming to enhance Indonesia’s global recognition by hosting the World Cup. Additionally, these word choices carry political symbolism, showcasing Jokowi’s diplomatic efforts and national aspirations on the global stage.

Discourse Analysis of Jokowi’s Speech on Israel’s Participation in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup

In this section, discourse analysis will be utilised to further breakdown Jokowi’s speech through the selection of several excerpts deemed pivotal in elucidating his narrative of surmounting global challenges while safeguarding domestic interests.

Excerpt 1: First, this is about principle that Indonesia has always been consistent and firm in supporting the Palestinian independence cause and the completion of a two-state solution between an Israeli state and an independent Palestinian state. This is in compliance with our Constitution. We refuse colonialism in any form as we always convey in bilateral, multilateral, and other international fora.

In this excerpt begins with a declaration of Indonesia’s unwavering commitment to principles, particularly concerning the support for Palestinian independence and the pursuit of two-state solution. By emphasising Indonesia’s consistency in advocating for Palestinian rights, the discourse strategically positions the nation as a champion of justice and human rights on the global platform, thereby enhancing its **global recognition** as a moral and ethical actor. Furthermore, the excerpt by framing its stance within the context of constitutional adherence and rejection of colonialism, Indonesia strategically aligns its foreign policy with deeply

ingrained national and historical narratives. This deliberate framing serves multiple purposes: it reaffirms Indonesia's commitment to its founding principles, it legitimizes its foreign policy decisions domestically, and it projects a **strong and unified national identity** to the international community. Given Indonesia's position and role, it is imperative for FIFA to sustain its collaboration with Indonesia in the development of world football, which includes the hosting of the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup.

Apart from portraying Indonesia as a moral and ethical actor with principled leadership on the global stage, this excerpt also encompasses a domestic interest dimension. Firstly, it aims to demonstrate the Jokowi government's adherence to its foreign policy principles, particularly in supporting Palestinian independence and advocating for a two-state solution involving Israel. Secondly, in alignment with the 1945 Indonesian constitution, the government emphasizes its solid commitment to opposing colonialism. However, it underscores Indonesia's strong dedication to peace, as evidenced by its involvement in UN peacekeeping missions across various conflict zones worldwide. This commitment to peace is enshrined in the constitution, which states that "... to participate toward the establishment of a world order based on freedom, perpetual peace and social justice...". Therefore, there is no justification for rejecting Israel's participation in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup.

Excerpt 2: Indonesia has gone through a long bidding and selection process to host the U-20 World Cup and managed to outperform Brazil and Peru in the final stage. At that time, all parties struggled and worked hard together so Indonesia can host the U-20 World Cup. And finally, in October 2019, Indonesia was appointed by FIFA to host the U-20 World Cup. It was an honor for the Indonesian people to host a sporting event with the most fans around the world.

This excerpt commences with an expression of pride, albeit subtly tinged with disappointment, as it reflects the extensive efforts undertaken by the Indonesian government and all relevant stakeholders, including Indonesian football association (PSSI), to secure the hosting rights for the FIFA U-20 World Cup, which appear to be on the brink of failure. The language used emphasizes Indonesia's arduous journey through a rigorous bidding and selection process, positioning the nation as formidable contender in the international arena. Jokowi not only elevates Indonesia's status but also asserts the country's capability to **compete and excel on a global stage**. Otherwise, references to the collective effort of "all parties" and the honour bestowed upon the FIFA U-20 World Cup as a symbol of Indonesian's collective achievements and aspirations. Further, the mention of hosting a sporting event "with the most fans around the world" serves as a potent **symbol of Indonesia's global significance and influence**, projecting an image of national pride and prowess on the international stage.

In the domestic context, Jokowi endeavours to convey to the public Indonesia's arduous journey in securing the opportunity to host the FIFA U-10 World Cup. Indonesia found itself contending with nations boasting advanced football prowess, such as Brazil and Peru. Nonetheless, through unwavering determination and persistent efforts, Indonesia emerged triumphant, ultimately being selected to host the FIFA U-10 World Cup in 2019. The privilege of hosting such a prestigious global event regarded as an invaluable honour and source of national pride. Therefore, all sectors of society must extend their support to Indonesia's government which has devoted support for Palestine, notwithstanding the complexities surrounding Israel's participation in the event.

Excerpt 3: We had no idea about the participating team because it was still in the pre-qualification process. We only found out about the Israeli national team has passed the selection for the FIFA U-20 World Cup in July 2022. I can assure that Israel's participation in the FIFA U-20 World Cup has no relation to Indonesia's consistent foreign policy stance on Palestine because our support for the Palestinian cause has always been solid and strong. In this regard, we agree with the Palestinian Ambassador to Indonesia that FIFA member associations must obey the rules. Hence, we cannot mix up sports and politics.

This excerpt commences with an expression that carries a defensive tone regarding the qualification process for participants in the FIFA U-20 World Cup, a process over which the Indonesian government has no direct control. Nevertheless, once again, President Jokowi asserted that it has no bearing on Indonesia's consistent foreign policy stance on Palestine. He seeks to affirm Indonesia's reputation as a faithful supporter of the Palestinian cause. By emphasizing this stance, Jokowi uses this rhetoric to reinforce Indonesia's image as a principled advocate for justice and solidarity on the international stage, and a morally upright nation.

Simultaneously, the discourse emphasizes Indonesia's firm solidarity with Palestine and its adherence to the principle of separating sports from politics. President Jokowi's alignment with the Palestinian Ambassador to Indonesia's assertion that FIFA member associations must adhere to the rules underscores Indonesia's commitment to upholding international norms and principles. Therefore, for Jokowi, there is no cause for concern among public regarding Israel's participation in this event, as affirmed by the Palestinian ambassador who acknowledges Indonesia's steadfast support for Palestine. Consequently, Israel's involvement is strictly confined to the sport event and devoid of political implications. All societies must refrain from conflating sports with politics, particularly given its potential ramification for Indonesia's standing on the global stage.

Once again, these excerpts convey a significant message underscoring Indonesia's strong commitment to hosting the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup, inclusive of Israel's participation, alongside its unswerving dedication to championing Palestine. This commitment remains resolute and unquestionable, not only to the international community and FIFA but also to the people of Indonesia. It demonstrates a strategic communication approach aimed at garnering global recognition while leveraging political symbols to secure domestic support.

Discussion

In this study, it becomes evident that Jokowi's speech was meticulously crafted, taking into consideration the evolving societal dynamics surrounding Israel's involvement in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup slated to be held in Indonesia. Analysing conducted using NVivo 12 Plus and discourse analysis reveals a linkage of specific words with sentences that underscore the significance of global recognition and the utilization of political symbols, particularly emphasizing consistent support for Palestine to sway both the international community and the domestic community. Broadly speaking, Jokowi's response to the issue of Israel's participation in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup exemplifies the application of what Putnam terms "two level game theory" (Putnam, 1988). Jokowi is observed as adeptly balancing domestic and international interests, mirroring his dynamic approach to navigating global politics, especially considering major powers such as the US and China (Rosyidin, 2023). It is apparent that regardless of the strategy employed, economic and political calculations predominantly dictate Jokowi's actions and policies (Arif, 2022; He, 2021; Laksmiana, 2017; Rosyidin, 2017), including those related to this event. According to the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy, Indonesia incurred a loss

of IDR 3,7 trillion due to the event's failure to take place. These losses encompass preparation and infrastructure cost, amounting to trillions of rupiah (Hariani, 2023; Putri, 2023).

The political landscape in Indonesia played a pivotal role in shaping the discourse and outcomes concerning the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup and Israel's participations issues. Two influential figures, Bali Governor Wayan Koster and Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo, emerged as key players whose actions significantly impacted the event's trajectory. Both Koster and Pranowo belong to the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Indonesia's largest political party, which adds an additional layer of complexity to the internal dynamics of the opposition to Israel's involvement. For Governor Koster, his opposition was influenced by political pressure and ideological considerations, reflecting the deep-rooted for the Palestinian cause among parts of the Indonesian population. Similarly, Governor Pranowo's refusal to Israel's participation in this event underscores his alignment with the pro-Palestinian sentiment prevalent among many Indonesians. Additionally, given his position as the strong presidential candidate in 2024, his policy can be seen as an attempt to bolster his political profile by appealing to a significant segment of the electorate that oppose normalisation with Israel. Indeed, their opposition not only reflects the deep-seated support for Palestine in Indonesia, but also highlights the challenges Jokowi faced in balancing local and international expectations.

Since the inception of his political career, Jokowi appears cognizant of the significance of populism as a pivotal asset for accruing power and legitimacy within society (Asfar et al., 2024; Rakhmani & Saraswati, 2021; Wicaksana & Wardhana, 2021). Organising international events, be they political or entertainment-cultural on the global stage, serves as a crucial element to bolster his popularity. For instance, following the success of hosting of the 2022 G20 event, Jokowi experienced a notable surge in popularity (Hafil, 2022). Thus, the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup presents another opportunity for Jokowi to amplify his popularity, aligning with ambition to support his son in the 2024 presidential election. Despite the controversy surrounding Israel's participation in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup, Jokowi's adeptness in communicating with the domestic audience warrants particular attention. The inclusion of the popularity aspect is crucial due to the politization of the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup. Notably, governors from the two of the six host provinces, who opposed and call for boycott of Israel's participation are political opponents of Jokowi, namely Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo (Lai, 2023) and Bali Governor Wayan Koster (Regan & Jamaluddin, 2023).

In this context, global recognition assumes two dimensions: international community recognition and domestic acknowledgement. Internationally, Jokowi aims to showcase Indonesia's commitment to global norms and moral integrity through this event. Additionally, he seeks to demonstrate Indonesia's capability as a competent host for international events, including its willingness to accommodate all participants, including Israel, a member of the international community. Domestically, Jokowi endeavours to instil a sense of pride among Indonesians in hosting global event like the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup, a feat not within the reach of every nation. While some may harbour reservations and resistance to Israel's participation, many perceive it as an opportunity for Indonesian people to witness their national football team compete on the world stage – an aspiration shared by the entire Indonesian football community. The public's disappointment appears to be specifically targeted at the two aforementioned governors who are boycotting Israel (BBC Indonesia, 2023). Several Indonesian national players have voiced their frustration. For instance, Diego Michiels expressed his disappointment, stating *"Thanks boss, you both rock! Don't forget to take responsibility when we're banned again!"*. Another national player, Stefano Lilipaly, criticised the decision with an Instagram caption stating *"gone"* and *"funnier"* (Rismawan, 2023). Former national player Robi Darwis expressed sharper criticism, who stated that:

“Impian kami harus hancur oleh orang-orang yang berbicara mengatasnamakan kemanusiaan. Jangan terlalu memikirkan negara lain jika ingin berbicara kemanusiaan. Kenapa kalian diam ketika tragedi kanjuruhan yang memakan korban lebih dari 100 nyawa hilang? [Our dreams must be shattered by people who speak in the name of humanity. Don’t think too much about other countries if you want to talk about humanity. Why were you silent when the Kanjuruhan tragedy claimed more than 100 lives?”(Febriansyah, 2023).

Those who favour of the event are primarily focused on the golden opportunity to witness the Indonesian national football team compete in the World Cup and are indifferent to Israel’s participation. They perceive the chance to host such a prestigious international event and showcase the national football team on a global stage as a unique opportunity not to be missed. The politization of Israel’s involvement appears less palatable, particularly given the proximity of this event to the 2024 presidential election agenda. In contrast to this, peoples who support the cancellation of the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup have also voiced their opinions through various statements. For instance, one of the demonstrators expressed:

“Alhamdulillah kami bersyukur atas dibataalkannya secara resmi oleh FIFA Piala Dunia U-20 di Indonesia, karena ada salah satu pesertanya berasal dari Israel, di mana pemerintah Indonesia secara resmi telah memberikan jaminan keamanan atas kedatangannya. Ini yang dari awal kami keras menolaknya [Thank God, we are grateful for the official cancellation by FIFA of the U-20 World Cup in Indonesia, because one of the participants came from Israel, where the Indonesian government has officially provided a security guarantee for his arrival. This issue [Israel] that we have strongly refused from the beginning” (Luthfiani, 2023).

It means political symbolism assumes a dual dimension: the portrayal in the Islamic world and within domestic society. For Jokowi, it is imperative to ensure that Indonesia’s hosting of the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup, inclusive of Israel, does not elicit objections from the Islamic world. Similarly, he aims to assuage concern among the domestic populace, particularly those who staunchly support Palestine, by reaffirming Indonesia’s constitutional commitment. The public is urged to differentiate between sports and politics concerning Israel’s participation, with Jokowi strategically quoting the Palestinian Ambassador’s statement to underscore Indonesia’s unwavering support for Palestinian independence. However, the societal discourse has revealed ambiguity surrounding the separation of sports and politics, fuelled by instances showcasing double standards in the politization of sporting events, including by President Jokowi himself. For instance, in 2018 organizers and presidential security guards prevented Governor of Jakarta Anies Baswedan, who was perceived as a political rival of Jokowi, from accompanying him. This incident has gone viral on the internet, and occurred while Jokowi presented the President Cup Trophy to the Persija Jakarta team, an event of which Anies was proud as governor of Jakarta (The Straits Times, 2018).

The interplay between global recognition and political symbolism presents a compelling dynamic within the Indonesian context, particularly concerning the cancellation of 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup. Intriguingly, a survey revealed that the majority of respondents supported Israel’s participation in the planned tournament, indicating a desire within society for a clear delineation between politics and sports (Irham, 2023). However, the political symbol employed in the Jokowi’s discourse as a counter-narrative to anti-Israel sentiment failed to sway both FIFA and the general public in Indonesia. Given the political reality of Israel’s presence in the international arena, navigating this issue poses a complex challenge for Indonesian policy makers, who must tread carefully to uphold national interests while respecting global norms and diplomatic considerations (Nugroho, 2023).

Conclusion

Using discourse analysis assisted by NVivo 12 Plus, this study uncovered significant insights that contribute to the existing literature and provide a fresh perspective on contemporary Indonesian foreign policy. The discourse surrounding Indonesia's response to Israel's participation in the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup reveals the complicated interplay between global recognition, political symbolism, and diplomatic pragmatism. President Jokowi's strategic navigation of this complex terrain underscores the multifaceted nature of Indonesia's foreign policy, grounded in the "free and active" doctrine, which seeks to balance national interests, diplomatic principles, and international obligations. Specifically, this analysis highlights the significance of global recognition as a key motivator of Indonesia's participation in international events, exemplified by the desire to showcase the nation's capacity to host prestigious tournaments like the 2023 FIFA U-20 World Cup. However, this aspiration must be carefully balanced against the domestic sentiments and political realities, particularly regarding the sensitive issue of Israel's involvement.

Jokowi's approach to the controversy surrounding the Israel's participation in this event, indeed, reflects the core tenets of Indonesia's "free and active" foreign policy. Jokowi's balancing strategy through the acceptance of Israel's participation to adhere to international norms and regulations (demonstrating a commitment to hosting international events) with a strong reaffirmation of support for Palestine (highlighting Indonesia's moral stance and solidarity with oppressed nations). His efforts to separate sports from politics and maintain Indonesia's credibility on the global stage while managing domestic opposition are indicative of a pragmatic application of the "free and active" doctrine. This balancing strategy also underscores Indonesia's strategic autonomy and its efforts to navigate complex international dynamics without compromising its core values.

Nevertheless, it is essential to acknowledge the limitations of this study. Firstly, the analysis primarily focuses on Jokowi's discourse, overlooking the perspectives of other key stakeholders such as government officials, civil society actors, and international organizations. Additionally, the study's reliance on discourse analysis may have neglected the underlying power dynamics and structural factors influencing Indonesia's response to the issue. Moving forward, future research could explore these limitations by adopting a multi-stakeholder approach, incorporating interviews, survey, and archival research to provide a more comprehensive understanding of Indonesia's foreign policy dynamics. Furthermore, comparative studies with other countries facing similar dilemmas could offer valuable insights into varying strategies employed by nations in navigating sports-political controversies. Therefore, recommendations for future research include examining the role of media framing and public opinion in shaping Indonesia's response to international sport events. Moreover, longitudinal studies tracking the evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy discourse and its implications for regional diplomacy could offer alternative analysis into the country's evolving diplomatic strategy.

Ultimately, Indonesia's response to the issue underscores the complexity inherent in navigating the intersection of sports, politics, and diplomacy on the global stage. As the country continues to assert its presence in international affairs, it must grapple with the competing demands of national interests, diplomatic imperatives, and moral principles, all while striving to maintain its reputation as a principled and respected member of the international community. Jokowi's handling of this situation reflects Indonesia's ongoing commitment to its "free and active" foreign policy, which demonstrated a balance between upholding international engagement and maintaining core national values.

Acknowledgment

This research could not be realized without the generous support whether material or immaterial from Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta especially through the “Internal Research Grant FY 2023/2024.”

AI Acknowledgment

Generative AI or AI-assisted technologies were not used in any way to prepare, write, or complete essential authoring tasks in this manuscript.

Conflict of Interests

We declare that we have no conflicts of interest in this research.

Funding

The author(s) declare that there is no funding.

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Appendix

Full version of Jokowi's speech

Assalamu'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Esteemed Guests.

First, this is about principle that Indonesia has always been consistent and firm in supporting the Palestinian independence cause and the completion of a two-state solution between an Israeli state and an independent Palestinian state. This is in compliance with our Constitution. We refuse colonialism in any form as we always convey in bilateral, multilateral, and other international fora.

I also take this opportunity to convey that Indonesia has gone through a long bidding and selection process to host the U-20 World Cup and managed to outperform Brazil and Peru in the final stage. At that time, all parties struggled and worked hard together so Indonesia can host the U-20 World Cup. And finally, in October 2019, Indonesia was appointed by FIFA to host the U-20 World Cup. It was an honor for the Indonesian people to host a sporting event with the most fans around the world.

We had no idea about the participating team because it was still in the pre-qualification process. We only found out about the Israeli national team has passed the selection for the FIFA U-20 World Cup in July 2022. I can assure that Israel's participation in the FIFA U-20 World Cup has no relation to Indonesia's consistent foreign policy stance on Palestine because our support for the Palestinian cause has always been solid and strong. In this regard, we agree with the Palestinian Ambassador to Indonesia that FIFA member associations must obey the rules. Hence, we cannot mix up sports and politics.

Currently, FIFA is also aware of the rejection of the Israeli national team's participation in the U-20 World Cup. However, both the Government and Indonesia's football governing body PSSI are still striving to seek the best solution.

Therefore, I have delegated PSSI Chief, Mr. Erick Thohir, to meet with FIFA team to resolve the issue.

That concludes my statement.

Thank you.

Wassalamu'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh.